Self-Identity and Moral Maturity

Abstract

The central discussion is about how a person grows into a mature moral being only to the extent that certain aspects of his general sense of self have developed first. Most importantly, I argue that the process of psychological identification that is so central in adult self identity formation is also the linchpin in coming to moral maturity; that is, that moral maturity presupposes that a person is already what I call a ‘full identificatory self’. I begin the discussion in section 1 by drawing a general picture of psychological development, starting from the most rudimentary attachment hunger (but relative agency poverty) of infancy to the more independent agency (yet continuing attachment hunger) of adulthood. I point out the importance that psychological identification has in this lifelong march toward independent agency. We see identification as the process of taking a valuational ownership of one’s developing character states, that being the central process in becoming an agency self. In section 2, I discuss how a person’s sensing of his self identity (i.e., his unfolding capacity for identification) is captured quite nicely by Bernard Williams discussion of `the personal point of view’ that a person brings to his central life projects and concerns. I suggest that Williams mistakenly thinks the personal point of view to be crucial to one’s moral identity. In fact, it is at the heart of one’s broader self identity — at the heart of one’s general capacity to identify. In section 3, I argue for the central thesis that moral maturity presupposes that a person identify with the moral perspective. A person who merely acts by moral dictates but doesn’t bring her full self identificatory capacities to bear on these actions is not a morally autonomous and mature individual. In sections 4 and 5, I compare my notion of moral development with competing theories. I also tackle the question of why persons identify at all with the moral life.

For developmental researchers of all disciplines, ‘internalization’ is the central issue for understanding morality.

Robert Emde (1988, p. 33).