Abstract
A theory of personal identity over time relevant to questions of responsibility for past actions should be a psychological theory because of the mind impregnated character of human actions. Psychological theories, however, are generally hard-pressed for delivering a strong conception of personal identity. The best they can do is to provide a notion of identity as connectedness and continuity of mental contents over time. This can be accounted for in terms of causal connections in and through the brain. But such connectedness should at least be complemented by narrative connectedness and continuity. The main point of the paper is that a fundamental break in a life’s narrative indicates the birth of a new self — a new person — numerically distinct from the person before the break.
An early version of this paper was presented at an ‘expert seminar’ on ‘Personal and Moral Identity’ organized by the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy in Amsterdam, January 12–14, 1999. Later versions were read in Milwaukee and Jerusalem. I am indebted to the several audiences for comments and criticisms. I owe special debts to Marc Slors, Igor Primoratz, and the editor of this volume for their thoughtful and stimulating written comments.
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van den Beld, T. (2002). Responsibility and Personal Identity. In: Musschenga, A.W., van Haaften, W., Spiecker, B., Slors, M. (eds) Personal and Moral Identity. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9954-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9954-2_3
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