Abstract
In the closing pages of this study, I contemplate the basic outline of a contemporary pedagogy for antilogical argument Many of the principles of this pedagogy have already been introduced, most explicitly in my discussions of Cicero and Quintilian But while the educational innovations of Greek and Roman Sophism are obviously the inspiration for what follows, their precedent does not provide a blueprint for contemporary instruction Put another way, imitatio at this distance would require not only the vigilant mediation of historical consciousness but also monotonous disclaimers to “please note the vast differences between ” Instead, it seems best to declare at the outset that the classical conception of antilogical argument has been refashioned in attire suitable to the practical conditions of contemporary pedagogy The Institutio Oratoria is an invaluable model for the teaching of argument; but two millennia of demographic, social, and material transformations, along with a sea-change in conceptions of social justice, simply don’t admit blithe adaptation As a scholar investigating the history of my discipline, I have tried in preceding chapters to shift my attention between past and present, theory and practice; as a teacher, however, my commitments are weighted in favor of the present.
[In learning to speak and judge well, it is] “wonderfully useful ... to rub and polish our brains by contact with those of others.“
Montaigne, “The Education of Children”
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Notes
See, for example, the adaptation of the term in business motivational literature: e.g., in Linda Ellinor and Glenna Gerard’s Dialogue: Rediscover the Transforming Power of Conversation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).
The outline of dialogic theory that follows in the next few pages is a digest of ideas from a variety of modern philosophical traditions, including Buber’s existential anthropology, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and Bakhtinian dialogism. See also A. Clark, J. Poulakos 1971, and J. Stewart. Bibliographies of rhetorical studies in dialogue can be found in Stewart 1978 and Ward 1994.
The same point is made by R. G. Collingwood: in order to find out what a person means by a certain statement, “you must also know what the question was to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer” (1939, 31).
The general nature of the foregoing discussion gives rise to a great many questions: e.g., How is the object of inquiry related to or affected by dialogical relationships? Does dialogue require mutual commitment to the same protocols? How does dialogue accommodate disrespect, injustice, and inequities of power? Does dialogue function differently in forensic and deliberative contexts? What kind of dialogue is possible when we “converse” with texts rather than interlocutors? Can the dialogical principles I have outlined operate in scientific arguments in which universal concepts play a role? Given the scope of the Epilogue, I can only ask my readers to keep these potential complexities in mind as they contemplate the implications for argument of an emphasis on dialogical relations.
See Michael Carter’s forthcoming study of starting points for composition.
Historically, the distinction made here between a purely negative scepticism and the generation of opposing counter-arguments has its roots in the difference between the negative dialectics of the Academician Arcesilaus and the positive approach of his follower Carneades during the Hellenic development of scepticism (see Ch. 5, sec. 1).
I pass over the issue raised earlier that, under working conditions, it may be difficult to distinguish between invention and judgment. Nonetheless, the issue is interesting and deserves attention.
Granted, the appeal to the moral “duties” in a homogeneous community like the ruling class of Cicero’s Rome is likely to be less problematic than in most modern societies; but the De Officiis makes clear that, despite the importance of the virtues to judgment, their use is always attended with complications.
For a careful analysis of the Ciceronian origins, the historical development, and the modern prospect for practical ethics or causuistic reasoning, see Jonsen and Toulmin (1988).
I am referring to the study of practical ethics and working politics, not the academic versions of these two areas of study, which are generally quite abstract.
I am, of course, assuming a great deal at this point, most notably that the dialogical relationship is still intact and characterized by respectful critique, and that, conversely, no one has hijacked the argument by dogmatic insistence or force. If granted the persistence of dialogue in good faith, the argumentative process should be no less dialogical during judgment than it is during invention. After all, testing requires counterpoint, while calculating preponderance will proceed by claims pro and con delivered by advocates and critics, not by someone speaking in proxy for a missing agent. It is hubris to assume we can speak for others, especially our opponents; it is despotism to refuse those involved the right to contribute on their own, especially those whose voices have not yet been heard. Finally, dialogue needs to persist because, in determining a decision, all those affected have a perspective that needs to be heard if judgment is indeed to be just.
Readers will recall that the terms “better and worse” have been unfairly applied to Protagorean theory since Aristotle: as in “making the worse case the better.” See Ch. 3, sec. 1.
Put another way, I have chosen to confine myself to working out the “internal logic” of Protagorean pedagogy rather than consider my own proposals in relation to allied and opposing trends in contemporary research. Much is lost in foregoing the latter approach, and antilogic itself argues that I have a responsibility to enter into dialogue with other contributors to argument pedagogy. Next time.
Some groups of students will be more uniform in belief than others. But the teacher who employs the rhetorical/pedagogical strategies of in utramque partem and sceptical opposition should have more than an adequate share of diverse interpretations to work with.
Throughout this paragraph and the next, I am indebted to Professor Bender’s fine article on rhetorical imitation (1993).
For theoretical discussion of the use of cases in rhetoric and composition classes, see Flower 1981 and Brockman 1984.
In earlier chapters, I addressed the political and ethical biases of analogical practice (see Ch. 2, sec. 1; Ch. 3 passim). In the present context, I will only rephrase what I have claimed before—that rhetorical knowledge follows practical experience, that method is a technical extension of theoretical commitments, and that when students practice specific methods they are experimenting with particular kinds of epistemic commitment, with particular conceptions of knowledge and value.
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Mendelson, M. (2002). An Appropriate Pedagogy for Antilogical Argument. In: Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice and Pedagogy of Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9890-3_7
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