Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 73)


Although the Epicurean argument is a very powerful argument for resisting the common-sense view of death generally a person’s death is a great harm to him I have shown, in Chapter One, that the Epicurean argument is defective. Hence, at this point, I can at least claim that it is possible that death can be a harm to the person who dies. However, to really secure this conclusion, it is necessary to give further justification.


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  1. 1.
    See Introduction, Assumption 4.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    In claiming that death is a harm, I am claiming that in general death is a harm. It may be that in particular circumstances death is a good thing, all things considered. This point was considered earlier and I am ignoring this possibility for the present discussion.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See Hugh LaFollette, Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 19.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See Ibid., pp. 66–68; and Thomas A. Mappes, ‘Abortion’, in Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy, 3rd ed., eds. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 1–8.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jack Li
    • 1
  1. 1.Fooyin Institute of TechnologyTaiwan

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