Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the questions: Is the desire-thwarting theory acceptable? If not, why? Let me outline this theory first.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
I know the notion of desire and the notion of wish are different in a strict sense. To simply our discussion, 1, following most desire-thwarting theorists, use ‘desire’ to mean: desire, want, or wish.
See Steven Luper-Foy, ‘Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 270–271.
‘The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality’, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 85.
See Ibid., pp. 85–86.
See Steven Luper-Foy, ‘Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 276.
‘The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality’, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 85.
‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 16.
See Steven Luper-Foy, ‘Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 276.
See ‘The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality’, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 87. Ruth Cigman also sheds a light on this point by comparing ‘the death of a person’ (which is a misfortune) with ‘the death of an animal’ (which, she argues, is not a misfortune because animals cannot have categorical desires). See Ruth Cigman, ‘Death, Misfortune and Species Inequality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981), pp. 47–64.
Steven Luper-Foy, ‘Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 275.
Ibid.
‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 17.
In some very special circumstances, it is possible for someone to have no unconditional desires, and, thus, (2) might be challenged. However, for most healthy people, in most circumstances, the death (event) does thwart certain kind(s) of their unconditional desires. Thus, (2) can be generally accepted. In short, (2) is not the essential problem in the desire-thwarting argument. To respond to this challenge, we at most need to have a slight modification for the desire-thwarting argument as follows: (i) Something is a harm or misfortune for us if it thwarts any of our desires. (ii) Death is a harm or misfortune for us, if it thwarts certain kind(s) of our unconditional desires. Even (2) is understood in this way, I would say that the desire-thwarting theory is still seriously flawed. See ‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.18.
See Joel Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.177. The distinction between fulfilment and satisfaction was made originally by W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), p. 300.
Joel Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.177.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 178.
See Ibid.
See Ibid.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, relevant passage in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 202.
Stephen E. Rosenbaum, ‘Epicurus and Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.300.
See Ibid.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Li, J. (2002). The Desire-thwarting Theory. In: Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies?. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 73. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9868-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9868-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5973-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9868-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive