Abstract
It is popularly believed that death is the most terrifying of ills. Besides, death is a matter of ultimate concern for each of us—everyone will directly face it sooner or later. But no one, while still alive, can ever experience it. This might be part of the reason why death has appeared as a riddle or mystery (or even an inexpressible beauty) to many human beings. Given this, it should not be any surprise that death has long been addressed in a variety of inquiries: religion (or theology), psychology, medicine, and literature. Of course, philosophy is among these. Death in fact is a vitally important topic in philosophy. Plato (427–437 B.C.) even insisted that, ‘...those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death.’
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Notes
Plato, Phaedo, 64a, trans. Hugh Tredennick, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 46.
This issue is too broad to be appropriately addressed with the scope of this book.
For a philosophical discussion of the possibility of an afterlife, see C. J. Ducasse, A Critical Examination of the Belief in Life after Death (Springfield: Illinois University Press, 1961); Terence Penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existence (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970); Antony Flew, Body, Mind, and Death (New York: Macmillan, 1964); and John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 1976).
See Joel Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 171; and Jeff McMahan, ‘Death and the Value of Life’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 233–234.
Throughout this book I use ‘he’, ‘him’, or ‘his’ as gender-neutral pronouns.
See ‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 4.
Ibid., p. 6. For discussions of the biological approach, see Lawrence C. Becker, ‘Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975), pp. 335–359; and David Lamb, ‘Diagnosing Death’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978), pp. 144–153.
‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 6. For discussions of the moral approach, see Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974); Howard Brody, Ethical Decisions in Medicine, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981); and Howard Brody, ‘Brain Death and Personal Existence: A Reply to Green and Wikler’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (1983), pp. 187–196.
‘Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 6–7. For discussions of the metaphysical approach, see Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler, ‘Brain Death and Personal Identity’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980), pp. 105–133; George J. Agich and Royce P. Jones, ‘Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1986), pp. 267–274; and Karen Grandstrand Gervais, Redefining Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
For a discussion of this view, see L. W. Sumner, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’, Nous 10 (1976), pp. 154–157; and Jeff McMahan, ‘Death and the Value of Life’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), fn. 2.
See Stephen E. Rosenbaum, ‘How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defence of Epicurus’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 121.
Rosenbaum also makes a similar point. See Stephen E. Rosenbaum, ‘The Harm of Killing: An Epicurean Perspective’, in Contemporary Essays on Greek Ideas: The Kilgore Festschrift, eds. Robert M. Baird, William F. Cooper, Elmer H. Duncan, and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Waco: Baylor University Press, 1987), pp. 208–209.
See L. W. Sumner, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’, Nous 10 (1976), pp. 153–154. For an interesting discussion of this topic, see Jeff McMahan, ‘Death and the Value of Life’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 259–261.
See ‘The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality’, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 85–86; and Steven Luper-Foy, ‘Annihilation’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 270–276.
See Fred Feldman, ‘Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 308; Palle Yourgrau, ‘The Dead’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 140; Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, ‘Why Is Death Bad?’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 222; and ‘Death’, in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
By ‘premature death’, I mean the fact that people die before their natural biological life expectancy. According to this definition, if a person dies in his prime, he dies prematurely. On the other hand, if an old person dies at the limit of his natural biological life expectancy, he does not die prematurely. Unfortunately, however, most people do die prematurely. Note further that premature death as I mean here is different from the death event (or the event which brings about death) which happens while there is still the prospect of a worthwhile life for us.
See Joel Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 174.
See Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans H.A.J. Munro, in The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, ed. Whitney Jennings Oates (New York: Modern Library, 1957), p. 131.
See ‘Death’, in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 7–8.
See Frederik Kaufman, ‘Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996), pp. 305–312.
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, ‘Rationality and the Fear of Death’, in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 44.
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Li, J. (2002). Introduction. In: Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies?. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 73. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9868-2_1
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