Abstract
Much has been made about whether or not punishment is the state’s duty, instead of being its mere right. However, it need not be shown by the retributivist that the state has a duty to punish. For retributivism itself does not entail such a view, though some versions of retributivism espouse the claim that punishment is the perfect duty of the state, as Immanuel Kant avers. But as Jeffrie G. Murphy argues, all that needs to be shown by the retributivist (or by the utilitarian, if I am correct) is that the punishment of criminals is the state’s right, i.e., that it is justified for the state to exercise hard treatment on criminals if it so chooses.1 This is sufficient to ground both the institution of punishment as well as the practices of particular forms of punishment. The retributivist need not be committed to the position that each and every crime must be punished (a claim entailed by the view that the state has a duty to punish offenders) in order to be justified in inflicting punishment on offenders. Instead, retributivists might argue, as I do, that not every crime must be punished, perhaps because of practical considerations of resource capability. This is not to say, however, that the state forgives crimes it does not punish; it simply chooses not to punish them because of its lack of sufficient resources, ceterus paribus.
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References
Jeffne G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 180.
Zoltan Balazs, “Forgiveness and Repentance,” Public Affairs Quarterly, 14 (2000), pp. 105–27; Cheshire Calhoun, “Changing One’s Heart,” Ethics, 103 (1992), pp. 76–96; Richard S. Downie, “Forgiveness,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1965), pp. 128–34; Aurel Kolnai, “Forgiveness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXXIV (1973–4), pp. 91–106; Murphy and Hampton; Joanna North, “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” Philosophy, 62 (1987), pp. 499–508; Norvin Richards, “Forgiveness,” Ethics, 99 (1988), pp. 77–97; Tara Smith, “Tolerance and Forgiveness: Virtues or Vices?” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1 (1997),pp. 31–42.
Much of the following material is borrowed from G. A. Buttrick, Editor, The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible (New York: Abingdon, 1962).
Murphy and Hampton, pp. 15, 24.
Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Editors, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1993), pp. 45–66.
Murphy and Hampton, pp. 52–3.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 55. Hampton provides a more precise account of the nature of resentment (Murphy and Hampton, p. 57). She even distinguishes, rather incisively, between resentment and malicious hatred (Murphy and Hampton, pp. 70–1).
Murphy and Hampton, pp. 83–4.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 151.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 148.
Murphy and Hampton, pp. 150–2.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 158.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 119.
A similar point is made in Balazs, p 120, except that Balazs argues that “inasmuch as repentance is a moral duty, forgiveness is one, too” (Balazs, p. 126). I proffer a different notion of forgiveness, as we shall see. Rather than being a moral duty, forgiveness is morally supererogatory.
Murphy and Hampton, p. 154; Richards, p. 87.
Murphy and Hampton, pp. 16–19.
Perhaps attitude forgiveness is what some newly freed slaves in the U.S. engaged in when they “forgave” their former masters [See Howard McGary and Bill Lawson, Between Slavery and Freedom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992)].
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Corlett, J.A. (2001). Forgiveness, Mercy, and Retributivism. In: Responsibility and Punishment. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9851-4_6
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