Abstract
The purpose of the chapter is to establish the conceptual framework for, and articulate some of the pivotal assumptions of, the book. It attempts to set the stage for the analyses and arguments that follow, pointing the reader in the basic direction in which the philosophical discussion will go. It commences with some general remarks about the metaphysics of human action, and concludes with a concise sketch of what is meant by moral responsibility, a conception which, I believe, can and ought to undergird legal conceptions of criminal (liability) responsibility.
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References
For a discussion of a range of voluntariness-reducing factors, see Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution Reconsidered (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), p. 15.
Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Of course, there is a wealth of philosophical literature challenging this sort of analysis of the nature of human action. But a discussion of this analysis is beyond the scope of this project.
Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 5.
An example of such a hard case, in U.S. law, would be whether or not the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ought to protect hate speech. For a philosophical discussion of this problem see J. Angelo Corlett and Robert Francescotti, “Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech,” forthcoming.
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979).
Hart calls this “role responsibility.” See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Chapter 9 [Compare Kurt Baier’s notion of “task-responsibility” in Kurt Baier, “Guilt and Responsibility,” in Peter A. French, Editor, Individual and Collective Responsibility (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972), p. 52]. This notion of responsibility is also captured by R. S. Downie when he writes: “When collectives act individuals act, but those individuals act in roles whose capacities are defined by the nature of the collective…. Individuals are authorized by their collectives to act in certain ways, depending on the function of the collective” (See R. S. Downie, “Responsibility and Social Roles,” in French, Editor, p. 70). I do not, however, wish to imply that there are not important distinctions between this duty use of “responsibility” and the duties which are implied by rights (given the correlation, however imperfect) between rights and duties. Surely the duty 1 have in virtue of my role or position is not necessarily implied by another’s having a right, moral or otherwise, which holds against me at that time. Nor do I wish to discount the important distinction that has been made between duties and obligations [See Richard B. Brandt, “The Concepts of Obligation and Duty,” Mind, 73 (1964), pp. 374–93; E. J. Lemmon, “Moral Dilemmas,” The Philosophical Review, 71 (1962),pp. 139–58].
Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Chapter 6.
Indeed, this is an example where blame and role uses of “responsibility” are conjoined. For it was by virtue of his role as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army that Jackson was responsible for the carrying out of part of his campaign promise to commit genocide against Native Americans in that they stood in the way of manifest destiny.“
Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, Chapter 6.
Hart refers to this use of “responsibility” as “liability responsibility” (See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Chapter 9).
Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, Chapter 6.
Joel Feinberg, “Responsibility for the Future,” Philosophy Research Archives, 14 (1988–89), pp. 93–113.
Joel Feinberg, “Responsibility Tout Court,” Philosophy Research Archives, 14 (1988–89), pp. 74–92.
For a discussion of this sort of an example, see Joel Feinberg, “The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan,” Criminal Justice Ethics, 3 (1984), pp. 56–69.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 100–04.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice p. 100.
John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (London: Blackwell, 1994); Keith Lehrer, Editor, Freedom and Determinism (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1966); Keith Lehrer, “’Can’ in Theory and Practice: A Possible Worlds Analysis,” in Myles Brand and D. Walton, Editors, Action Theory (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 241–70; “Cans Without Ifs,” Analysis, 29 (1968), pp. 29–32. For a general introduction to this problem, see Laura W. Ekstrom, Free Will (Boulder: Westview, 2000).
Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Necessity,Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). These collections of Frankfurt’s work contain his most important work on moral responsibility. Among the finest works which seek to contribute to the ongoing discussion of moral responsibility include: Ton van den Beld, Editor, Moral Responsibility and Ontology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (London: Blackwell, 1994); John Martin Fischer, Editor, Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Editors, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); The Journal of Ethics, I:1 (1997), pp. 1–104; The Journal of Ethics, 3:4 (1999), 275–384; The Journal of Ethics, 4:4 (2000), pp. 307–417; Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Self-Expression,” The Journal of Ethics, 3 (1999) p. 296.
This notion of fault is borrowed from Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, p. 222.
Keith Lehrer, Metamind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
For philosophical accounts of (individual) knowledge, see Robert Audi, Epistemology (London: Routledge, 1998); Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Third Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989); Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview, 1990). For philosophical accounts of collective belief and/or knowledge, see J. Angelo Corlett, Analyzing Social Knowledge (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
“When one knowingly creates an unreasonable risk to self or others, one is reckless; when one unknowingly but faultily creates such a risk, one is negligent:” Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, p. 193.
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Corlett, J.A. (2001). The Problem of Responsibility. In: Responsibility and Punishment. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9851-4_2
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