Abstract
The date of the composition of the SLE is not without relation to a theory respecting its nature. If, for example, the SLE were to have been composed prior to, as well AS in proximity to the writing of the Prima secundae, then there would be some reason for regarding the former work as undertaken in preparation for the moral part of the Summa theologiae.1 However, in the 1950s Gauthier argued that Aquinas composed the SLE in 1271–1272, and so, after the completion of the Prima secundae} Subsequently, because of the use in the latter work of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, a version possessed by Aquinas only in late 1270, Gauthier proposed the Prima secundae as having itself been written somewhat later than previously thought.2 Consequently, Gauthier now dates the Prima secundae after early 1271 and the Secunda secundae after the summer ofthat year, thus late 1271–1272. Yet Gauthier’s original dates of 1271–1272 for the SLE, as well as its posteriority relative to the Prima secundae, continue to stand.3
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References
Gauthier, “La date du commentaire,” pp. 66–105.
Cf. Torrell, Initiation, p. 146, with note 12.
Ibid. p. 227, with note 10.
Cf. Aquinas: Opera omnia, T. 47, p.73*. The Tabula was printed for the first time in: Th. Aquinas: Opera omnia (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1971) T. 48. Individual items or statements of the Tabula will be cited according to the letter of the alphabet under which the statement is found, followed by the number of the first line of the statement. E.g., “M 393” is the statement beginning on line 393 under the letter M.
Prop. 178: “Quod finis terribilium est mors. — Error, si excludat inferni terrorem qui extremus est.” Tabula, M 393: “Quod mors est finis terribilissimum, quia terminus.” For Gauthier’s discussion of this point, cf. Ibid., pp. B 49–50. Also see, Hissette: Enquête, pp. 304–07, where the proposition is numbered “213.”
P 469 is intended to express NE.Wl.5.1140b22–24: “Et in arte quidem volens peccans eligibilior, circa prudentiam autem minus, quemadmodum et circa virtutes.” The Latin Ethics used in the Tabula is very close to that found in the Leonine edition of the SLE. Cf. Tabula, p. B 4L
Tabula, pp. B51–B55.
Gauthier argues that the presence in the SLE of a large number of incorrect interpretations of Aristotle in passages paralleling the correct interpretations in the Super Ethica permit the conclusion that Albert’s work was not being examined while Aquinas worked on the SLE. Cf. ”PraefaticT in SLE, p.254*.
E.g., R 4: “Quod racio operativa est optimum in homine et proprium; et secundum hoc inest ei proprium opus quod est félicitas.” F 201: “Quod finis civilis est humanum bonum.”
Ila–IIaeAl.l: ”Visio autem non est virtus appetitivae, sed cognoscitivae. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim cognoscitivam. Non autem ad vim sensitivam:... Unde relinquitur quod prudentia proprie sit in ratione.” lbid3.2A 3: ”...sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic, prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori, quo cognoscimus sensibilia propria: sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam et experimentum ad prompte iudicandum de particularibus expertis. Non tarnen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali: sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quandam applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum.” SLE. VI. 1.203–1 LSI 123: “Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particular et sic variabilia sunt nee cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis; unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sic autem accipit hie Philosophus contingentia, ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione;” Ibid.4.178–96.S1174: “Deinde...ostendit quid sit subiectum prudentiae. Et dicit quod, cum duae sint partes animae rationalis, quarum una dicitur scientificum et alia rationcinativum sive opinativum, manifestum est quod prudentia est virtus alterius horum, sicilicet opinativi; opinio enim est circa ea quae contingit aliter se habere, sicut et prudentia. Et tarnen, quamvis prudentia sit in hac parte rationis sicut in subiecto, ratione cuius dicitur virtus intellectualis, non tarnen est cum sola ratione, sicut ars vel scientia, sed requiritur rectitudinem appetitus.” Ä/W.7.255–63.S1215: “Et ad istum sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium, unde et animalia bruta quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dieuntur participare prudentia; sed illius sensus qui est circa propria sensibilia est quaedam alia species perfectiva, puta industria quaedam discernendi colores et sapores et alia huiusmodi.”
Commentaria Cardinalis Caeietani, no. Ill concerning IIa–IIaeA13 in Th. Aquinas: Opera omnia, T. 8 (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1895) p. 351.
Melina: La Conoscenza morale, pp. 176–81 asserts that Ila–IIaeAl.1–3 settled ”magisterally and definitively” the question of the subject of prudence by positing prudence in practical reason. Yet, Melina finds the SLE proposing that prudence is “a mixed virtue,” in part an intellectual habitus in reason, in part a moral virtue in the appetite. He thus witnesses, albeit unwillingly, to the fact of a difference at least in the manner in which Aquinas expresses his doctrine of prudence in the Ua-llae and the SLE. — Below, in note 123 on page 257, Melina’s interpretation is discussed.
In addition to the texts of footnote 10 above, Ha-Ilae. 47.1. ad 3: “...dicendum quod laus prudentiae non consistit in sola consideratione, sed in applicatione ad opus, quod est finis practicae rationis... Unde ibidem [i.e., EthicNl] Philosophus subdit quod prudentia non est solum cum ratione, sicut ars: habet enim, ut dictum est, applicationem ad opus, quod fit per voluntatem.”
SLE.VI.7.255–63.S1215. Cf. note 10 above.
Albert’s interpretation of this two-fold division, summarized briefly here, was discussed above in Chapter 2, “The two parts of the rational soul,” especially pp. 38–42.
Super EthicaNl. 2.p404,24–39.
Ibid.p404,40–54.
Ibid.p399,24–48; p399,71 –p400,15.
Ibid.p404,53–71.
Ibid.p444,9–20.
Ibid.p477,85–90: “...prudentia potest considerari aut quantum ad esse, quod habet in anima, et sic sensus non est perceptibilis prudentiae, cum sit in ratione. Sed si consideratur quantum ad obiecta, sic prudentia est sensus, quia est circa operabilia, quae sunt particularia et sensibilia.” A/rf.p478,9–25: “...sed prudentia est extremi, cuius nonestscientia nee intellectus, sed sensus.. Sed iste sensus, scilicet communis, magis est prudentia, idest magis est circa prudentialia quam circa mathematica...”
Ibid.l.p445,21–38: “Dicendum, quod prudentiae simpliciter et secundum totum non potest esse oblivio, sed bene potest esse, quod aliquis efficiatur minus habilis ad applicandum ad opus. Et huius ratio est, quia universalia iuris sunt in nostra natura, in quibus substantialiter est prudentia, et ista semper manent; sed secundum applicationem ad opus particulare oportet, quod perficiamur per experimentum et per alia iura scripta, quia ius illud universale est. Unde non potest applicari eodem modo ad omnia, sed oportet, quod habeatur aliquid simile regulae Lesbiae aedificationis,...et quantum ad hoc generatur per experimentum et tempus, et ad hoc etiam datur ars memorandi in Rhetorica, quia argumenta rhetorica trahuntur a particularibus circumstantiis negotii, sed quantum ad principia est semper manens...”
Cf. note 10 on p. 199 above; note 13 on p. 200 above.
Super EthicaNl.l considers NE. VI.5.1140a24–b30. The list of Tabula statements concerning those lines is found in Aquinas: Opera omnia, T. 48, p. B 168. The statements depending on Albert’s comment are the following: (the page and line numbers following each statement’s number refer to the comment of Albert) C 146 – p443,2–5; P 416 –p443,ll–22; F 229 –p443,32–33; P 451 – p443,39–42; P 469 – p443,88 – p444,l; P 423 – p444,5–20; 0 219 – p444,21–27. — One of the reasons the Tabula is judged to have been left unfinished is visible in that the above statements, all taken from a passage where Aristotle deals with prudence, were not all grouped under prudencia or prudens, but also variously under consilium, finis, and peccans. — O 219 is one of a number of statements inserted into the Tabula at a later date, but most likely an authentic part of the work, although not grouped under any principal idea. Cf. Aquinas: Opera omnia, T. 48, p. B 47.
Ibid.8.1142a23–9.1142a32.
Ms.VT.8.1142a23–30: “Quoniam autem prudentia non est scientia, manifestum; extremi enim est, quemadmodum dictum est; operabile enim tale. Susceptibiles quidem igitur intellectui. Intellectus quidem enim terminorum quorum non est ratio, haec autem extremi cuius non est scientia, sed sensus, non qui propriorum, sed quali sentimus in mathematicis extremum trigonum... Sed iste magis sensu prudentia, illius autem alia species.” Albert’s comment occupies 27 lines, with the pertinent being Super £Y/z/ctf.VI.13.p478,9–ll: “sed prudentia est extremi, cuius non est scientia nee intellectus...”
Ibid.VI.9.1142a31–32. Super Ethica.VlA3.p41S,27–32.
Ibid.p47,229: ”...quia prudentia est circa consilium, ostendit differentiam inter quaestionem et consilium.” Aristotle wrote in Ar£.VI.9.1142a31–32: “Quaerere autem et consiliari differunt; consiliari enim quaerere quoddam est.”
Aquinas’s account, as summarized here, is discussed more fully above in Ch. 2, ”The two parts of the rational soul,” pp. 35–47.
SLE.VI.1.150–59.S1119. Aquinas follows this by adding two more reasons to show the division into scientific and ratiocinative parts is not intended by Aristotle as a division within the essentially rational part of the soul. That is, this division would violate: (1) the doctrine that the same potency can know the perfect and the imperfect in the same genus; and (2) the more universal potency or the intellect can know everything known by the lower potency or sense. Cf. Ibid. 160–75.SI 120–21.
Ibid.176–89.S1122.
Ibid. 190–203.SI 123.
Ibid.203–O6.S1123.
Ibid.206–14.S1123: “...unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; sie autem aeeipit hie Philosophus contingentia, ita enim cadunt sub consilio et operatione; et propter hoc ad diversas partes animae rationalis pertinere dicit necessaria et contingentia, sicut universalia speculabilia et particularia operabilia.”
Cf. Ibid.7.255–60.S1215: “Et ad istud sensum, id est interiorem, magis pertinet prudentia, per quam perficitur ratio particularis ad recte aestimandum de singularibus intentionibus operabilium, unde et animalia bruta quae habent bonam aestimativam naturalem dieuntur partieipare prudentia;” IbidA. 178–85.S1174: “Deinde...ostendit quid sit subiectum prudentiae. Et dicit quod, cum duae sint partes animae rationalis, quarum una dicitur scientificum et alia ratiocinativum sive opinativum, manifestum est quod prudentia est virtus alterius horum, scilicet opinativi; opinio enim est circa ea quae continget aliter se habere, sicut et prudentia.”
Super Ethica.VA5.p379,10–12.
Sent.lll, d. 33, q. 3, a. 4e, ag. 5 & ra. 5.
IIa-IIae.120.2.ob 2.
Ibid.ad2.
The Statements refer to N£.V.10.1137a31–1138a2. Cf. Tabula, p. B 168. Of the 12, the following are dependent on the page and lines shown of Super EthicaN. 15: E 108 –p382,16–20; E 112 – p382,22–24; E 116 – p382,34–36; L 37 – p382,64–67; L 41 – p 382,76 – p383,3; E 125 – p383,17–20; L 48 – p383,26–30 & 37–44; E 128 – p 383,50–51 65.
SLE.V.16.12–17.S107S. In a note to these lines, the editor of the SLE admits he has not found the source of this new etymology.
Super EthicaM.l0.pl9l958–62 for civil courage; pl91,78–86 for military courage; p 192,41–46 for courage resulting from anger; pi93,1–5 for courage motivated by hope; pl93,34–35 for courage founded on ignorance. In addition to the information shown in the above schema, Albert states in each case that there is had the same “matter and act” as in genuine courage.
Ä/rf.pl93,48–62.
Aristotle’s text is NE.III.8.1116al7–l 117a28. The Tabula statements are listed in Aquinas: Opera omnia, T. 48, p. B 166. Statements depending on the Super Ethica, together with reference to the page and line of Albert’s comment are these: F 344 –c pl87,5–10; H 21 – p 187,17–19; P 96 – pl87,44–55; F 347 – pl88,2–4; M 440 – pl88,6–12 F 315 – pl88,24–29; F 321 – pl88, 33–36; F 409 – pl88,40–42 & 47–50; F 306 – p 188,55–57; F 309 – pl89,2–9; F 277 – pl89,10–14; I 723 – p 189,22–23; F 284 – pl89,30– 33; E 4 – pl89,38–39; F 287 – pl89,41–42; 168 – pl89,50–58; A 782 – pl89,59–62.
SLE.IÏL16.6–10.S559: “Cum enim vera fortitudo sit virtus moralis ad quam requiritur scire et propter hoc eligere, potest quidem aliquis exercens actum fortituninis tripliciter a vera fortitudine deficere.”
Ibid. 10–27.S559–61.
Cf. SuperEthica.TLJ.pl28,46–49; IV.5.p245,29–30; 7.p251,72–77. JIa–Uae.l3S.2c. ¦SZ,£.II.8.180–82.S344; IV.6.79–82.S711; 7.174–77.S732.
The reference to Ethicsll in the sed contra of Secunda secundae. 135.2 is to 7.1107bl9–20. The Tabula’s one statement concerning those lines has the appearance of being only a paraphrase of Aristotle’s text. Yet this is not surprising as Aristotle’s entire chapter 7 is but a summary statement of the mean in a variety of virtues. The content of that chapter appears to have posed few questions of interpretation for Aquinas, or for his secretaries, as only five of the Tabula’s 20 statements relative to that chapter show any sign of dependence on the Super Ethica.
P 5 depends on Super EthicalM.5.p245,26–27’. The etymology of the two Greek terms is found in the subsequent sentence, p245,29–34.
Cf. Aquinas: Opera omnia, T.47–I, pp. 259* and 263*; also, p. 104, note to lines 175–80.
Aquinas paraphrases slightly rather than cites yV£.IV.9.1128b21–22. Cf. SLE, p. 259.
Ar£.IV.9.1128b29–30. Cf. SLE, p. 259.
Super Ethica.W. 16.p304,27–30: “...ostendit...quorum sit secundum dispositionem habitus.” 72>/ö?.p304,41–42: “Deinde cum dicit: Neque enim studiosi, ostendit quorum sit ex dispositione habitus.”
Ä/Y/.p304,45–57.
Ä/rf.p304,58–73.
A/rf.p305,l–7.
IIa–IIae.U4A: ”Sunt tarnen sic dispositi ut si in eis esset aliquid turpe, de hoc verecundarentur: unde Philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic, quod verecundia est ex suppositione studiosi.”
The other two Tabula statements relevant to the discussion of shame are the following: V 287 – p304,46–47; S 166 – p304,73. (The page and line numbers refer to Super Ethica.YV.16.)
SLEJV. 17.113–21.S879: “Secundo excluait praedictam obviationem, ibi: Erit autem utique etc. Et dicit quod secundum praedictam obviationem verecundia esset quiddam virtuousum ex suppositione, quia scilicet verecundaretur virtuosus si turpia operaretur. Hoc autem non est de his quae proprie conveniunt virtuosis, immo absolute eis conveniunt, sicut patet circa omnes virtutes. Unde relinquitur quod verecundia non proprie conveniat virtuoso.”
Cf. Ila–IIae AS A; 128.1; 137.3; 143.1; 157.3.ad2; 161.4.
Ibid.161.4: “[Utrum humilitas sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae.] ...sicut supra dictum est, in assignando partes virtutibus praecipue attenditur similitudo quantum ad modum virtutis. Modus autem temperantiae, ex quo maxime laudem habet, est refrenatio vel repressio impetus alicuius passionis. Et ideo omnes virtutes refrénantes sive reprimentes impetus aliquarum affectionum, vel actiones modérantes, ponuntur partes temperantiae. Sicut autem mansuetudo reprimit motum irae, ita etiam humilitas reprimit motum spei, qui est motus Spiritus in magna tendentis. Et ideo, sicut mansuetudo ponitur pars temperantiae, ita etiam humilitas. Unde et Philosophus, in IV Ethic, eum qui tendit in parva secundum suum modum, dicit non esse magnanimum, sed temperatum: quern nos humilem dicere possumus.”
Ibid., 143.1: “[Utrum convenienter assignentur partes temperantiae.] Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observât circa aliquam principalem materiam, eundum observant in quibusdam aliis materiis in quibus non est ita difficile. Pertinet autem ad temperantiam moderari delectationes tactus, quas difficillimum est moderari. Unde quaecumque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et refrenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae sicut virtus ei adiuncta. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter: uno modo, in interioribus motibus animi; alio modo, in exterioribus motibus et actibus corporis; tertio modo, in exterioribus rebus. Praeter motum autem concupiscentiae, quem moderatur et refrénât temperantia, très motus inveniuntur in anima tendentes in aliquid. Primus quidem est... Alius autem motus interior in aliquid tendens est motus spei, et audaciae, quae ipsam consequitur; et hunc motum moderatur sive refernat humilitas. Tertius...”
Ibid. ,117.5: “[Utrum liberalitas est pars iustitiae.] Sed contra... Ergo liberalitas ad iustitiam pertinet.” [Corpus] “...liberalitas non est species iustitiae [i.e., not a “subjective part” of justice]: quia iustitia exhibet alteri quod est eius, liberalitas autem exhibet id quod est suum. Habet tarnen quandam convenientem cum iustitia in duobus. Primo quidem, quia principaliter est ad alterum, sicut et iustitia. Secundo, quia est circa res exteriores, sicut et iustitia: licet secundum aliam rationem... Et ideo liberalitas a quibusdam ponitur [potentialis] pars iusitiae, sicut virtus ei annexa ut principali.” “Ad tertium... Sed datio liberalitatis provenit ex eo quod dans est aliqualiter affectus circa pecuniam, dum earn non concupiscit neque amat. Unde etiam non solum amicis, sed etiam ignotis dat, quando oportet. Unde non pertinet ad caritatem, sed magis ad iustitiam, quae est circa res exteriores.”
SLE.IV.8.46–50.S738: “...ostendit quod magnanimus dignificet se ipsum magnis. Ille enim qui est dignus parvis et his se ipsum dignificat potest dici temperatus, prout temperantia large sumitur pro quacumque moderatione.”
Ibid.IV.1.32–38.S650: “Dicit ergo primo quod post temperantiam dicendum est de liberalitate. Et hoc propter convenientiam liberalitatis ad temperantiam; sicut enim temperantia moderatur concupiscentias delectionum tactus, ita liberalitas moderatur cupiditatem acquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores.”
Gauthier: “La date du commentaire,” pp.76–84.
Ibid., p. 84.
Super Ethica.II.7.pl29,1–5: “Deinde cum dicit: Circa honores, ponit quintam medietatem in honoribus et in honorabilibus, quae dicitur magnanimitas, qua aliquis decenter se habet ad desiderandum honores, et defectus oppositus dicitur pussillanimitas et abundantia chaunotes. “
Tabula, M 148: “Quod magnanimitas circa honores et inhonoraciones; superhabundantia autem caymotes, defectus vero pussillanimitas.”
Super Ethica.IV.S.p256$–30.
The four statements and the page and lines of their source in Super Ethica.TV. & are as follows: P 14 – p255,55–56; M 64 – p256,13; M 153 – p256,26–30; M 69 – p256,43–45.
M 66; M 79; M 146; M 148; M 153.
Ha–IIaeAl.9.ob 3: “Praeterea, Philosophais dicit, in IV, Ethic, quod ad magnanimum pertinet pigrum esse et otiosum. Pigritiae autem opponitur sollicitudo.”
Ibid.aà 3: “...magnanimus dicitur esse piger et otiosus, non quia de nullo sit sollicitus: sed quia non est superflue sollicitus de multis, sed confidit in his de quibus confidendum est, et circa ilia non superflue sollicitate.”
Tabula, M 20: “Quod magnanimi est esse ociosum et pigrum, in quantum non intromittit se quibuslibet operibus, set ubi honor magnus et opus, et est paucorum operativus set magnorum et nobilium.” Super Ethica.TV.l0.p263,33–3, writing about the properties of the magnanimous agent in his relation to others, asserts: “...et sic ponit [Aristoteles] primam et dicit, quod suum est esse otiosum et pigrum, in quantum non immittit se quibuslibet operibus, sed vel, idest solum, operate in his in quibus est magnus honor vel magnum opus. Et quia sunt pauca, ideo est paucarum operationum et tarnen magnarum et nobilium.” Aquinas’s version of the Ethics: NE.IV.3.1124b24–26 (SLE, p. 232): “Et otiosum esse et tardum, sed vel ubi honor magnus vel opus. Et paucorum quidem operativum, magnorum autem et nominabilium.”
SLEIV. 10.131–36.S771: “Dicit ergo primo quod ad magnanimum pertinet quod sit otiosum, ex eo sciliet quod non multis negotiis se ingerit, et quod sit tardus, id est quod non de facili se ingerat negotiis sed solum Ulis actibus insistât quid pertinent ad aliquem magnum honorem vel ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum.”
Gauthier: “La date du commentaire,” pp.98–104.
For Aquinas’s positions on the subject of continence and perseverance, see: Ia //tfe.58.3.ad 2 (continence and perseverance are perfections of the rational part of the soul, i.e., by implication, perfections of reason itself); 76/V/.109.10 (perseverance is a habitus mentis)’, IIa–IIae.53.5 (continence and perseverance are only in reason); Ibid.l31.2M 2 (perseverance strengthens reason and will); lb id. 143.1 (continence represses the movement of the will disturbed by passion); Ibid. 155.3c & ad 2 (continence is in the will as in a subject); £L£.VII.10.87–97.S1463 (”from what has been sIbid in this context, it is clear that for Aristotle the subject of continence is the will.”)
Sent.HL, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4b: “...virtutes humanae sunt quibus opus hominis bonum redditur; unde in omni potentia quae est principium humani operis, oportet esse habitum virtutis, quo opus ejus bonum redditur;...oportet quod in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes sicut in subjecto, quibus efficitur ut facile rationi obediant illae potentiae in quibus sunt; quod quidem contingit inquantum passiones reprimuntur, ut non rationem perturbent. Unde in illo qui passiones vehementiores patitur, sed non deducitur, est quidem habitus in ratione, qui tenet earn ne deducatur, non autem in viribus illis in quibus sunt passiones; sicut patet in continente;...”
SuperEthica.VR.l.p516,40–54: “Concedimus, quod [continentia et heroica virtus] sunt intellectuales. Ad hoc autem intelligendum est, quod ratio dupliciter considerari potest: aut per comparationem ad obiectum suum et sic perficitur intellectualibus virtutibus...; aut secundum quod est regitiva aliarum virtutum et aliae oboedientes ipsi. Et ita oportet, quod habeat duas perfectiones, quia anima potest considerari aut per essentiam suam,...et sic oportet, quod perficiatur anima virtute quadam divina; aut inquantum est anima et motor corporis et sic immiscetur passionibus et compatitur quodammodo eis, et sic oportet quod perficiatur continentia.”
Ibid.p5ll,21–25.
Ibid.8.p553,8–17: “...circa huiusmodi delectabilia tactus et tristias sunt quidam habitus principales, scilicet temperantia ut moralis virtus,...et inter intellectuales continentia, quae est similis virtuti,...quae etiam vincit eas [idest, delectationes] propter bonum rationis.”
A/d.VIII.l.p592,69–75: “Virtus enim intellectualis aut perficit rationem in se, et sic sunt illae de quibus determinatum est in Sexto, aut secundum quod per bonum rationis tendit in inferiorem potentiam, et sie est continentia,...aut secundum quod tendit in proximum, et sic est amicitia.”
For the identity of statements concerning the content of Super Ethica. VII. 1, see the listing on page B 169 of the Tabula relative to ME.VH.1.1145al6–31; for those regarding Super Ethica.VlI.S, see page B 169 relative to NE.VH.7.1150a9–bl6.
In addition to the passages studied in this Chapter, there are three others in the Secunda secundae differing from parallel sections of the SLE. These were not discussed above as their evidence is not particularly direct. (1) IIa–IIae. 182.1 asserts EthicsX offers eight proofs that the contemplative life is “simply better” than the active. SLE. X. 10–11 have a different interpretation of Aristotle’s text, for Aquinas finds the first six arguments of the Ha–IIae to conclude only that ultimate happiness lies in speculative activity. The Ila–IIae’s seventh argument is admitted by the SLE to be Aristotle’s sole proof for the superiority of the contemplative life, and the eighth argument of the IIa–IIae is for the SLE Aristotle’s response to an erroneous view. Super Ethica.X. 11 13 offer an interpretation identical to that later given in the SLE. The relevant Tabula statements point very strongly to the conclusion that, in their development, Aquinas did not examine Albert’s interpretation, but worked directly and solely from the Ethics itself. (2) IIa–IIae. 142.2 on the childishness of intemperance offers an apparently less mature reading of Ethics.III. 12 than does SLE. W1.12. The Tabula’s statements reveal a considerable debt to Super Ethica.lll. 15. (3) IIa–IIae. 168.2 on the virtue concerning recreation, has a strong resemblance to Super Ethica.TV. 15. The Tabula clearly depends on the Super Ethica in this case. However, SLEW. 16 differs from the IIa–IIae only in not containing any of the elements shared by the IIa–IIae and the Super Ethica.
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Doig, J.C. (2001). Dating the SLE . In: Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics . The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9771-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9771-5_5
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