Abstract
Suppose platonists could counter my causal objections and demonstrate that it is possible for us to have knowledge of acausal objects. This would still not establish the platonist position. First, I argue that the burden of proof is on platonists to explain how we do have such knowledge. Then I examine platonist attempts to provide such an explanation. I show that they are inadequate.
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References
Here, and in the following, I have paraphrased Casullo’s versions of the conditions for knowledge.
Carrier (1976, p. 250) and Lycan (1977, p. 122) make a similar point.
Maddy (1990, p. 45) points out that anti-platonists often make this ‘unspoken assumption’.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Cheyne, C. (2001). The Burden of Proof. In: Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5836-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9747-0
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