Abstract
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(SC) S knows that p only if the fact that p is causally connected to S’s belief that p
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Others may not use the terms ‘viable’ and ‘plausible’ in the same sense as I do.
‘[N]othing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism, which was not known, or assumed to be known, before.’ (Mill 1843/1973, p. 183).
The following argument is based on Cheyne 1989, pp. 16–17.
Plenitudinous or ‘profligate’ platonists grasp the nettle and assert that all possible sets exist in the one realm. I discuss plenitudinous platonism in Chapter 12.
The if-thenist theory for construing mathematics is (roughly) the claim that all mathematical propositions are logically true conditional statements of the form ‘A dT’, where A represents the conjunction of the axioms of a particular theory and T any theorem which can be derived from those axioms. (See Russell 1919, p. 204.)
Musgrave (1993, ch. 13) makes this point
Based on an argument of Field 1989, pp. 33–34.
It is far from clear that it is a case of entailment or logical consequence. No matter, since I propose that the whole idea be discarded.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Cheyne, C. (2001). Is a Causal Connection Necessary for Knowledge?. In: Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_5
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