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Theories of Legal Reasoning and Types of Judicial Conscience

  • Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 54)

Abstract

As we have seen from the previous chapters, conscience is a complex phenomenon. Since conscience is presented as a human mind passing moral judgements, the problem of the variety of these judgements in its relation to legal reasoning becomes important for the purpose of the present research. Legal reasoning means a kind of reasoning which through finding relevant facts, appropriate legal rules, and good reasons for the application of these rules to the case, leads to a legal decision. There are many states of conscience and there are many types of legal reasoning. The basic presupposition of this book is that a theory of legal reasoning and judicial conscience are closely related to each other. To a certain degree, the variety of theories of legal reasoning represents the variety of moral judgements made by the judges.

Keywords

Moral Judgement Legal Rule Legal Reasoning Judicial Decision Legal Decision 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of LawStavropol State UniversityStavropolRussia
  2. 2.Commercial Law and EthicsMae Jo UniversityChiang MaiThailand

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