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Explanation pp 251-275 | Cite as

Can Psychological Processes be Explained? A Call for a Revitalized Behaviorism

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Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 302)

Abstract

All too often in our laboratory search for new discoveries, psychologists ignore the epistemological roots of their science. It is almost a rarity these days when meetings such as the one that led to this volume are held to consider some of the foundation premises on which modern psychology is based. Yet, without such a consideration, it is not only possible but probable that this science will go off in a direction that leads to a dead end or, even worse, a totally believable and plausible, but completely incorrect, theoretical assumption. As we see in this volume, it is most often philosophy, the bete noir of all too many experimental psychologists, that provides the interpretive clarification that helps us to avoid potential explanatory absurdities.

Keywords

Mental Process Perceptual Experience Psychological Process Thought Process Implicit Learning 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

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