Abstract
All too often in our laboratory search for new discoveries, psychologists ignore the epistemological roots of their science. It is almost a rarity these days when meetings such as the one that led to this volume are held to consider some of the foundation premises on which modern psychology is based. Yet, without such a consideration, it is not only possible but probable that this science will go off in a direction that leads to a dead end or, even worse, a totally believable and plausible, but completely incorrect, theoretical assumption. As we see in this volume, it is most often philosophy, the bete noir of all too many experimental psychologists, that provides the interpretive clarification that helps us to avoid potential explanatory absurdities.
I am very grateful to Dr. Cyril Latimer and the Department of Psychology at the University of Sydney, Australia for their hospitality and support during the time I spent writing this chapter. As a visiting scholar, I profited enormously from the vigorous intellectual life of their community.
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Uttal, W.R. (2001). Can Psychological Processes be Explained? A Call for a Revitalized Behaviorism. In: Hon, G., Rakover, S.S. (eds) Explanation. Synthese Library, vol 302. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9731-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9731-9_11
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