Kant on Extension and Force: Critical Appropriations of Leibniz and Newton

Abstract

In the history of modem philosophy Kant is often described as the arch-epistemologist, taking a “Critical turn” through the construction of a grand synthesis of the rationalist and empiricist traditions, which emphasise either reason or the senses (respectively) as the exclusive source of knowledge, by arguing that “[w]ithout sensibility, no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought... Only from their unification can cognition arise” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [CPR], A51/B75).¹ As apt as this description of Kant qua pure epistemologist may be, it is clear that it must be supplemented in many ways. In addition to his revolutionary work outside theoretical philosophy in ethics and aesthetics, Kant is particularly interested in physics throughout his career. Although Kant’s epistemology influences his physics in significant ways², it is important to consider questions that arise at the level of physics in order to see that his epistemology does not contribute to the resolution of all such questions all by itself.