Abstract
“Semantic incommensurability”, i.e., non-translatability of concepts taken from different theories, is at the focus of the argument. I attempt to give a rational reconstruction of the notion underlying the writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. I claim that such a coherent notion can be identified and that relevant instances exist. Incommensurability is brought about by theoretical incompatibility. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility of jointly fulfilling two conditions of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places on translations. Potential conceptual analogs either fail to preserve the conditions of application or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. This feature turns out to be correlated with a cross-classification of the pertinent scientific kinds. These relations between incommensurable concepts are sufficient for making an empirical comparison of the claims couched in these concepts possible.
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Carrier, M. (2001). Changing Laws and Shifting Concepts. In: Hoyningen-Huene, P., Sankey, H. (eds) Incommensurability and Related Matters. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 216. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_2
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