Abstract
I’ve worked to bring metaphors into the scope of possible worlds semantics by providing logical truth-conditions for metaphors in an intensional calculus (the extended predicate calculus (XPC)). Traditional possible worlds semantics defines some logical space which it then carves up into worlds. Worlds are usually thought of as big chunks of logical space: as spatio-temporal totalities or maximal consistent sets of propositions. While worlds are useful, they aren’t precise enough to provide truth-conditions for metaphors. Logical space can be carved up into much smaller parts — it can be divided in a more finely-grained way.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Steinhart, E.C. (2001). Conclusion. In: The Logic of Metaphor. Synthese Library, vol 299. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9654-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9654-1_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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