Abstract
Global convergence to a signaling system equilibrium in the replicator dynamics is proved for a simple signaling game that I discussed in Evolution of the Social Contract. The proof generalizes to a wide class of adaptive dynamics
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bomze, I.: 1991, ‘Cross Entropy Minimization in Uninvadable States of Complex Populations’ Journal of Mathematical Biology 30 73–87.
Skyrms, B.: 1996, Evolution of the Social Contract. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, B.: 1998, ‘Salience and Symmetry-Breaking in the Evolution of Convention’, Law and Philosophy, 17, 411–18.
Skyrms, B.: ‘Evolution of Inference’, in T. Kohler, and G. Gumerman, eds., Dynamics of Human and Primate Societies: Agent Based Modeling of Social and Spatial Processes, forthcoming.
Weibull, J.: 1997, Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, Cambridge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Skyrms, B. (2000). Convergence to a Signaling System Equilibrium. In: Nida-Rümelin, J., Spohn, W. (eds) Rationality, Rules, and Structure. Theory and Decision Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5463-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9616-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive