Intentions and the Shaping of One’s Decision Problems

Abstract

Decision Theory is often seen as an idealized and formalized rendering of common-sense psychology. But usually questions concerning what shapes a decision problem are completely neglected. I argue that it is at least partially the role of intentions, plans and other kinds of complex mental states to structure decision problems. Which actions are feasible, which circumstances are relevant, can be partly determined by what prior intentions, plans or dispositions an agent has adopted. I distinguish different forms of how this structuring can take place. Some of those are compatible with decision-theoretic orthodoxy, some seem to lead to deviation from the orthodox account. In the last section I explore the relationship of my previous discussion to the debate concerning resolute choice and conclude that there is no definite verdict to be taken.

I have to thank the participants of the Bielefeld conference for discussion and Thomas Schmidt and Erich Ammereller for their useful comments on later versions.