Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that the standard decision theoretic axioms provide core principles action-guiding preferences of rational agents should be required to satisfy. This, however, does not involve a commitment to consequentialism.
It can be rational to be polite. To behave politely requires to follow certain rules. A. Sen has shown that following these rules is incompatible with acting as a consequentialist. Sen proposes, therefore, to give up some principles of decision theory. I argue instead that a ‘comprehensive’ description allows for both: being polite and acting in accordance with the principles of decision theory. This is possible because these principles should be interpreted as an expression of coherentism, not of consequentialism.
I am grateful for having had the opportunity to discuss my arguments with John Broome, Ned McClennen, Michael Slote, Wolfgang Spohn and others during the conference. I thank Martin Rechenauer and Thomas Schmidt for reading this paper and proposing valuable amendments.
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Nida-Rümelin, J. (2000). Rationality: Coherence and Structure. In: Nida-Rümelin, J., Spohn, W. (eds) Rationality, Rules, and Structure. Theory and Decision Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_1
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