Abstract
One of the central theses of this book is that, with the possible exception of some collective action dilemma situations to be discussed later, cooperation contexts depend on the correlation of preferences in interaction situations: The more strongly the participants’ initial preferences are correlated the more possibilities of cooperation (and cooperative helping activities) there are. Furthermore, cooperation typically requires that the participants share a cooperative attitude disposing them to make their relevant preferences (and actions) mesh with others’ preferences (and actions). Cooperative preferences can be shown to be decomposable into various underlying, mainly situational components of social dependence (or control). In this chapter I will present a technical account of the components of social dependence (or rather the inverse relation of control) which I developed and published several years ago (Tuomela, 1984, 1985a). This theory of the components of social control or dependence is a generalization and technical refinement of the theory developed by Kelley and Thibaut (1978). In the next chapter we will see how to connect this account to the theory of cooperation developed earlier in this book. While the material in the present chapter is needed for a precise understanding for some later developments in this book, a reader not interested in technical discussion may read the chapter only cursorily.
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Notes
The present system contains handy information to account for the correspondence also with respect to the three components of control and not only for the total correspondence. Thus the index for H1, viz., for the row player is (math) where s2 ri represents the row effect variance of player i and cov r12 the respective covariance. corr r 12 represents the degree of correspondence between the row player’s control over his own utilities and over the other player’s utilities. In the case of the example (math), which is rather close to its minimum (math).
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Tuomela, R. (2000). The Components of Social Control and Dependence. In: Cooperation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 82. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5411-1
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