Abstract
Empiricism in the philosophy of mathematics has quite a long history, and the version of this approach which I will try to sketch in what follows is naturally based on a development of older views. It seems sensible therefore to start by considering some of these earlier versions of the position. I will not, however, attempt a complete history of empiricism in the philosophy of mathematics, but rather mention just those earlier ideas which I would like to incorporate, at least partially, in my own theory. My starting point is accordingly Mill’s philosophy of mathematics, which he expounded in A System of Logic (Mill 1843, Book II Chs. 5 and 6 and Book III Ch. 24).
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Gillies, D. (2000). An Empiricist Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Implications for the History of Mathematics. In: Grosholz, E., Breger, H. (eds) The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge. Synthese Library, vol 289. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9558-2_3
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