Abstract
After long international negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 — if it enters into force — sets legally binding emissions targets for a basket of six greenhouse gases. These targets apply to most OECD countries and countries with economies in transition. A novel feature is the use of a commitment period that runs from 2008 to 2012 instead of a single target year. Moreover, the Protocol allows for the use of so-called flexible mechanisms: emissions trading (Art. 17), Joint Implementation (JI) (Art. 6) and projects of the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) with countries without emissions targets (Art. 12). All these instruments must be ‘supplemental’ to domestic measures.1 Supplementarity has not been defined in the Protocol, however. If average emissions in the commitment period are lower than the emissions target, the difference can be banked for the next commitment period. In the case of higher emissions the country will be in non-compliance.
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Michaelowa, A., Stronzik, M. (2000). Early crediting of emissions reductions — a panacea or Pandora’s box?. In: Carraro, C. (eds) Efficiency and Equity of Climate Change Policy. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9484-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9484-4_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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