Abstract
To understand historical change, one must obviously compare something old with something new. So analysis of scholasticism is a vital part of any sustained discussion of the events which this volume symbolically attaches to the year 1543. The reason for this is not simply the bland fact that medieval philosophy is part of the ‘background’, but something far sharper: a rejection of scholastic attitudes is central to the Scientific Revolution itself.1 One of the things here rejected was medieval matter theory; another (perhaps) was the scholastic view of supernatural causes. The present paper explores the connections between these two doctrines, with a view to clarifying the fortunes of belief about the supernatural in the course of the Scientific Revolution. What does the abandonment of the medieval view of matter by the mechanists of the seventeenth century tell us about changing attitudes to the function of supernatural actions in the operation of the world? This is the question which links my discussion to 1543, but it is not a question that I will be directly answering here.2 Instead, I shall concentrate on the rejected views themselves, one part only of the larger topic.
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Notes
The sort of scholasticism studied for such purposes should, of course, emphasise that set out and taught within early modern Europe, for that is most likely to be the prime target of contemporary hostility to the older outlook. But there are severe obstacles to doing this, the most notable of which is the general lack of a sympathetic secondary literature to guide one’s researches. As a consequence, and as a definite compromise, I am forced to look at scholasticism over a much broader time-scale, and to use an eclectic mixture of sources from far earlier periods, thus blurring changes in the scholastic outlook. Such a technique is obviously dangerous, but the risks are undoubtedly worth taking—by comparison with the certainty that the many accounts of early modern science which effectively ignore scholasticism are taking far greater liberties, and making very real errors—witness the various discussions that presume the notion of natural law to be a novelty of seventeenth-century philosophy! Such claims are easily refuted by the most cursory glance at earlier traditions.
I have sketched an answer to this question elsewhere: see K. Hutchison, ‘Supernaturalism and the mechanical philosophy’, History of Science 21 (1983) 297–333 and ‘Dormitive virtues, scholastic qualities, and the new philosophy’, History of Science 29 (1991) 245–78, esp. pp. 262ff. The present discussion differs from those earlier ones in (a) its emphasis on the occult sciences, (b) its contrasting the naturalistic aetiology of such sciences with their supernaturalistic epistemology, and (c) its portrayal of the mechanical philosophy as neutral on the classification of fundamental cause.
E.g., B. Hansen, ‘Science and magic’, in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages (Chicago, 1978) 483–506, pp. 489–91;
B. Copenhaver, ‘Astrology and magic’, in C. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler & J. Kraye (eds), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988) 264–300, pp. 282–4;
B. Copenhaver, ‘Scholastic philosophy and renaissance magic in the De vita of Marsilio Ficino’, Renaissance Quarterly 37 (1984) 523–54, passim, but esp. pp. 524, 531–2;
Thomas Aquinas, ‘On the occult works of nature’, in J.B. McAllister, The letter of Saint Thomas Aquinas De occultis operibus naturae (Washington, 1939) 20–30. There is of course a great deal of uncertainty in the literature as to exactly what the word ‘scholastic’ should be taken to mean, but that problem seems of only minor importance in the present discussion, where the focus is on the specific doctrine of hylemorphism. Though this doctrine was central to scholasticism, it was also widely accepted in the various deviant philosophies of the Renaissance, and nothing in the discussion below hinges significantly on how broadly we conceive scholasticism. Yet Copenhaver does note (’Astrology and magic’, pp. 292–3;
B. Copenhaver and C. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (New York, 1992) pp. 318–9) significant departure from Peripatetic hylemorphism in the Renaissance, though he also observes a retention of the terminology (on which see Note 24 below).
I know of no sustained exposition or analysis of medieval (as opposed to ancient) hylemorphism in the secondary literature, but fragmentary accounts, especially of the disputes centred on it, are common: see e.g.: Copenhaver, ‘Scholastic philosophy and renaissance magic’, pp. 539–49; Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, pp. 303–5; E. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, trans. C. Dikshoorn (Oxford, 1961) pp. 200–4;
A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1962) pp. 213–6;
A. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science A.D. 400–1650 (London, 1952) pp. 44–52.
For my illustration via the melting of snow, compare the brief remarks in Dijksterhuis, Mechanization, pp. 19–21 (on Aristotle); Albertus Magnus, Book of Minerals, trans. Dorothy Wyckoff (Oxford, 1967) I.i.9 = p. 33; Aquinas, ‘Occult works’, p. 20; Nicole Oresme Le livre du ciel et du monde, [Middle French translation of, and commentary on, Aristotle, On the heavens, together with English trans.], eds A. Menut and A. Denomy, trans. A. Menut (Madison, WI, 1968) p. 683. For the power of ‘gravitie’, see: Aquinas, ‘Occult works’, p. 20;
A. Ross, The Philosophicall Touch-Stone (London, 1645) pp. 13–4, 16–7; for the virtus justificanda, see: Hutchison, ‘Dormitive virtues’, pp. 268–70, 277–8nn.62–3, citing e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, [Summa theologiae, Latin and English, various translators] Dominican edn. 61 vols (London, 1963–80) 3a.66,2 = v.57, pp. 10–11.
See e.g.: Dijksterhuis, Mechanization, pp. 431–3; B. Easlea, Witch-Hunting and the New Philosophy, (Brighton, Sussex, 1980) pp. 111–43; B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford, 1980) pp. 1–2;
Hutchison, ‘Dormitive virtues’, passim; J. Henry, ‘Occult qualities and the experimental philosophy: Active principles in pre-Newtonian matter theory’ History of Science 24 (1986) 335–81, esp. pp. 337–51.
E.g.: René Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols. trans. E. Haldane and G. Ross (Cambridge, 1931) pp. 120–1, 254–5;
Robert Boyle, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, ed. and annot. M. Stewart (Manchester, 1979) pp. 57, 63;
Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, [De la recherche de la verité, 6th French edn, 1712], ed. G. Rodis-Lewis, trans. T. Lennon and P. Olscamp (Columbus, Ohio, 1980) with commentary by Thomas Lennon, p. 446; Leibniz, Letter to Hartsoeker of 10 Feb., 1771, as trans. by Cajori in Issac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 2 vols, trans. A. Motte, rev. F. Cajori (Berkeley, 1966) V.2, pp. 668–9; idem, fifth letter to Clarke, G. W. Leibniz, and S. Clarke. The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester, 1956; 1717), Leibniz’ letters trans. by Clarke, p. 94.
K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1971) pp. 33–40; Hutchison, ‘Dormitive virtues’, pp. 270–1.
For various examples of these misleading presumptions, see: N. Steneck, Science and Creation in the Middle Ages: Henry of Langenstein (d. 1397) on Genesis (Notre Dame, IND., 1976) pp. 108 (celestial and supernatural influences identified), 114 (celestial influences then paralleled to other occult powers), 119 (occult and supernatural causes identified), 129 (contrast between occult and natural causes);
D. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic: From Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958) pp. 109–10 (contrast between occult and natural causes);
S. Talmor, Glanvill: The Uses and Abuses of Scepticism (Oxford, 1981) p. 25;
A. Guerrini, ‘Ether madness: Newtonianism, religion and insanity in eighteenth-century England’ in P. Theerman and A. Seeff (eds), Action and Reaction (Newark, NJ., 1993) 232–54, esp. pp. 232–4 (contrast between supernatural and mechanical).
For the naturalism associated with the revival of Aristotle, see the discussion, and sources cited, in Hutchison, ‘Supernaturalism and the mechanical philosophy’, pp. 304–11; idem, ‘Dormitive virtues’, pp. 265–8; idem, ‘Individualism, causal location, and the eclipse of scholastic philosophy’, Social Studies of Science 21 (1991) 329–35.
Jean Bodin, La République (Paris, 1583; facs. reprint, Aalen, 1961) pp. 542–3, 550. For other examples of this sharp contrast between causation by implanted powers and supernatural causation, see: Aquinas, Summa theologica, 3a.78,4 (= v.58, pp. 182–5); Buridan, Questions on the Physics, in M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959) p. 536; Oresme, Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature: A Study of his De causis mirabilium, ed. and trans, etc. Bert Hansen (Leiden, 1986) pp. 136–7; M. Luther, Luther’s Works, (v.1: Lectures on Genesis, ed. J. Pelikan, trans. G. Schick, (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1958); v.35, ed. E. Bachmann, various translators, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1960); v.36, ed. A. Wentz, various translators, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959)) v.l, pp. 29–30, v.36, pp. 64–7; E. Grant, ‘Medieval and Renaissance scholastic conceptions of the influence of the celestial region on the terrestrial’ Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 17 (1987) 1–23, p. 22; Ross, Philosophicall Touch-Stone, pp. 16–7; Malebranche, Search after Truth, pp. 446–9, 466, 658.
For the distinction between occult and manifest qualities, see: Hutchison, ‘Occult qualities’, esp. pp. 233–5; Dijksterhuis, Mechanization, pp. 157–8. According to Copenhaver (’Scholastic philosophy and renaissance magic’, pp. 525–6), the distinction comes from Galen.
For these limitations on human understanding, see: Aquinas, Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, trans. K. Foster and S. Humphries (London, 1951) p. 456 (on Aristotle, On the soul, 432al-10); Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.84,7, la.2ae.91,4 (= v.12, pp. 38–43, v.28, pp. 30–1).
B. Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, trans. H. Hargreaves (Berkeley, 1990; 1686) p. 11; cf. Galileo, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans. and annot. edn Stillman Drake (New York, 1957) p. 274; Boyle, Selected Papers, pp. 31–2;
J. Glanvill, Vanity of Dogmatizing: The Three Versions, ed. S. Medcalf (Hove, Sussex, 1970) pp. 171–2; Hutchison, ‘Occult qualities’, pp. 242–9; G.M. Ross, ‘Occultism and philosophy in the seventeenth century’, in A. Holland (ed.), Philosophy, its History and Historiography (Dordrecht, 1985) 95–115, p. 102.
See, for example: Augustine, De civitate dei contra paganos, xxi.4–5 (= Loeb Classical Library edition (London, 1957–72), trans. G. McCracken [and other(s)] v.7, pp. 14–33); Aquinas, Summa theologica, 2a.2ae.96,2 (= v.40, pp. 74–5). See also Notes 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40 below.
Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, III.97.17 (= bk.3, pt.2, p. 72 of University of Notre Dame Press ed., trans. A. Pegis [and other(s)], Notre Dame, 1975). For an extended discussion of this issue, see Hutchison, ‘Dormitive virtues’, passim.
J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols, ed. J. McNeill, trans. F. Battles (London, 1961) v.1, pp. 181, 201; Luther, Works, v.1, pp. 29–30.
For various examples of these claims, doubts, and uncertainties, see n.1, plus: Pseudo-Galen, Diagnosis and Cure of Kidney Diseases (K., hn XIX, 677–8) as trans. Copenhaver, ‘Scholastic philosophy and Renaissance magic’, p. 526; ongoing discussion of power of talismans, Copenhaver, op.cit., passim; Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.110 (= v.15, pp. 2–18), 3a.77,l (= V.58, pp. 124–31), 3a.75,2 (= v.58, pp. 58–63); Steneck, Science and Creation, pp. 97, 184n.38 (Henry of Langenstein on magnetism); Oresme, Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum, II.xxvi–II.xxx (trans. in M. Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions, Madison, 1968; 1351–6, pp. 336–55); Grant, ‘Scholastic conceptions’, p. 17 (Richard of Middleton on Maimonides); Hutchison, ‘Occult qualities’, pp. 241–2; S. Clark, ‘The scientific status of demonology’, in B. Vickers (ed.), Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1984) 351–74, pp. 353–4, 358–60; L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols (New York, 1923–53) v.2, pp. 342–3, 346, 358, v.4, pp. 208, 227, 287, 499; Albertus Magnus, Minerals, II.i.1 = pp. 55–57, from where the quoted passage is taken. It is clear from its context that Albertus is not discussing manifest properties in this passage, for the opening paragraph of his second Book refers the reader to Book I for these simpler properties. His reference to constituents (in the quoted words) confirms this: see Hutchison, ‘Occult qualities’, p. 240.
Aquinas, Summa theologica, 3a.64,1 (= v.56, pp. 100–5); 3a.78,4 (= v.58, pp. 182–5).
Aquinas, Contra gentiles, III.105.10 (= bk.3, pt.2, pp. 96–7); idem, Occult Works, pp. 21–3. Cf. Steneck, Science and Creation, pp. 102–3.
Ross, Philosophicall Touch-Stone, p. 29 (with adjustments to capitalizations, fonts etc.); Oresme, De configurationibus, I.xxv, II.xxvi–xxxv (= pp. 236–9, 336–75); Albertus Magnus, Minerals, I.i.6, II.i.l (= pp. 24–5, 56–7). For other examples, see: Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.110,4 (= v.15, pp. 14–7); idem, Contra gentiles, III.103–107 (= bk.3, pt.2, pp. 86–99); Thomas, Decline of Magic, pp. 203, 255–7, 362, 368; Walker, Spiritual Magic, pp. 107–11; Clark, ‘Scientific status’, pp. 364–5; Ross, ‘Occultism and philosophy’, p. 102.
Aquinas, Contra gentiles, III.104 (= bk.iii, pt.2, pp. 89–93).
Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia.110.1 (= v.15, pp. 4–5: planets exert some power), 1a.110.3 (= v.15, pp. 12–13: tides caused by power of the moon); Aquinas, Contra gentiles, III.92–3, 104 (= bk.3, pt.2, pp. 42–50, 89–93).
Luther, Works, v.l, pp. 227–8, v.36, pp. 64–7. Cf. v.l, pp. 95–6; v.35, pp. 33–44.
Whether such nominalism was ever applied to hylemorphism by philosophers much closer to the scholastic camp than Luther, I do not know (but see above, Note 3). The existence of such philosophies would help make sense of those frequent seventeenth-century claims noted above that the scholastic doctrine was vacuous—for (as we have already seen, Note 15) this is patently false of the standard realist version of the theory. For the views of the English Reformers see Kirsten Birkett’s paper in this volume.
Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.110,1–1a.111,1; 1a.114,4 (= v.15, pp. 2–23, 80–5); idem, Contra gentiles, III. 101–3 (= bk.iii, pt.2, pp. 81–9); idem, On the power of God [Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei], 3 vols, trans. English Dominican fathers (London, 1933; reprinted on demand, Xerox) VI.6.3–5 (= v.2, pp. 167–88, quoting from pp. 177, 180); Oresme, Livre du ciel, p. 293; Clark, ‘Scientific status’, pp. 360–3.
See, e.g.: Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 177–8; J. Wippel, ‘Essence and existence’, in N. Kretzmann (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982) 385–410, pp. 394, 407–10; Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.50,1–2; 1a.76,4 (= v.9, pp. 2–15; v.15, pp. 64–71); idem, Contra gentiles, I.17,11.49–56, 68–71 (= bk.1, pp. 101–3, bk.2, pp. 146–68, 203–13).
Clark, ‘Scientific status’, pp. 362–5; J. North, ‘Celestial influence—the major premiss of astrology’, in P. Zambelli (ed.), Astrologi Hallucinati’: Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time (de Gruyter, 1986) 45–100, pp. 76–8; Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.110, 4 (= pp. 14–7); idem, Power of God, VI.6.3 (= v.2, pp. 167–78); idem, Contra gentiles, III.103.9 (= bk.iii, pt.2, p. 89).
North, ‘Celestial influence’, p. 47 (citing Cicero, De natura deorum, 44 = ii.16 = pp. 242–3); B. Ward, Miracles and the Medieval Mind: Theory, Record and Event 1000–1215 (London, 1982) pp. 4–5; Copenhaver, ‘Scholastic philosophy and renaissance magic’, p. 539; Aquinas, loc. cit. Note 19, plus: Contra gentiles, III.86.10 (= bk.3, pt.2, p. 28).
Aquinas, Contra gentiles, II.79–89 (= bk.2, pp. 254–308), III.19–20 (= bk.3, pt.1, pp. 75–81); idem, Power of God, III.3.9 (= v.1, pp. 151–3); J. Randall, ‘Introduction to: Pomponazzi, On the Immortality of the SouV in E. Cassirer et al. (eds), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man [selections, in trans. with commentary etc.], (Chicago, 1967) 257–79.
Aquinas, Contra gentiles, I.3 (= bk.1, pp. 63–6); W. Hine, ‘Marin Mersenne: Renaissance naturalism and Renaissance magic’, in B. Vickers (ed), Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, (Cambridge, 1984) 165–76, p. 166.
E. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York, 1938) passim’,
J. Randall, The Career of Philosophy, (New York, 1961) v.1, pp. 31–6;
D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London, 1962) pp. 261–4;
M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963) pp. 122–3; Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.117,1 (= v.15, pp. 131–5); idem, Contra gentiles, III.52–3 (= bk.3, pt.l, pp. 177–82).
Quoting John of Jaudan, from Gilson, Reason and Revelation, pp. 56–63. Cf. E. Grant, ‘Cosmology’, in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages (Chicago, 1978) 265–302, p. 269; Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 195–6; Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, pp. 108–9; Aquinas, Contra gentiles, 11.18–21, III.41–6 (= bk.2, pp. 55–64, bk.3, pt.l, pp. 133–8).
Augustine, De civ. Dei, xi.5 (= Loeb v.3, pp. 440–7); xviii.53 (= Loeb v.6, pp. 78–9, citing Acts 1.7 on time of second coming); xxi.4–5 (= Loeb v.7, pp. 14–33); P. Brown, Augustine of Hyppo: A Biography (London, 1967) pp. 152. For later resonances of these notions, see: Oresme, De configurationibus, II.xxxi = pp. 358–61; C Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660 (London, 1975) pp. 514; Thorndike, History of Magic, v.3, pp. 156–9; Clark, ‘Scientific status’, p. 367. For the common idea that human ignorance was a punishment for original sin, see Note 36 below. The notion of a sacred mystery is not, of course, intrinsically Christian, and can be found in classical authors, e.g., Lucan, Civil War, trans. J. Duff (London, 1928, Loeb Classical Library) I.419 (= pp. 34–5: on the cause of the tides).
Aquinas, Contra gentiles, III.38–57 (= bk.3, pt.l, pp. 125–92.)
Oresme, De configurationibus, II.xxxi = pp. 358–61.
Ross, Philosophicall Touch-Stone, pp. 34, 56–7 (with a large gap in the quotation). For other examples of Ross’ notion here that human ignorance results from original sin, see Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty, pp. 73–4; : Cf. Webster, Great Instauration, pp. 324–5, 482, 508; J. Webster, Academiarum examen, [1653, pp. 26–30]. Facs. reprint on pp. 67–192 of: Science and Education in the Seventeenth Century: The Webster-Ward Debate, ed. annot. etc. A. Debus (London, 1970) p. 27 (=†Debus edn, p. 109).
Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a.84.7 (v. 12, pp. 38–43: limited knowledge of God), 2a.2ae.96,2 (= V.40, pp. 74–5: with non mistranslated here as ‘not yet’); idem, Contra gentiles, I.3 (= bk.1, pp. 63–6).
See, e.g.: Giambattista Andreini, L’Adamo, [1613]. Trans. on pp. 227–67 of: W. Kirkconnell, The Celestial Cycle. The theme of Paradise Lost in world literature with translations of the major analogues (New York, 1967) pp. 245–8; Webster, Academiarum examen, pp. 108–12; Thorndike, History of Magic, v.7, pp. 333, 434, 484, 490–1, v.8, p. 267; G. Molland, ‘Roger Bacon and the Hermetic tradition in medieval science’, Vivarium 31 (1993) 140–60, pp. 141ff.; Thomas, Decline of Magic, pp. 271–2.
J. Weyer, Witches, Devils, and Doctors in the Renaissance, [De praestigiis daemonum, 1583], trans. J. Shea (Binghamton, NY, 1991) p. 26; cf. Aquinas, Contra gentiles, 11.96–101 (= bk.2, pp. 325–42); Thorndike, History of Magic, v.2, pp. 407–8, v.4, pp. 271–2, 284, 324–5.
Thomas, Decline of Magic, pp. 270, 271–2, 634; Webster, Great Instauration, p. 86; Clark, ‘Scientific status’, pp. 364–5; Thorndike, History of Magic, v.2, pp. 281, 321–2, 865, v.4, pp. 116, 170–1, 224–5, 499.
Osiander, ‘To the reader’, p. 22 of Copernicus, On the revolutions’, Thomas, Decline of magic, pp. 362–3.
For a selection of sources, see above, Note 5.
Descartes, Philosophical Works, v.1, pp. 168–9, 227–8, v.2, pp. 219–20.
Gassendi, in Descartes, Philosophical Works, v.2, pp. 168–170.
For a supernaturalistic interpretation of Boyle and Newton, see: Hutchison, ‘Supernaturalism and the mechanical philosophy’, pp. 298–9, 318–9, 325; McGuire, ‘Boyle’s conception of nature’, Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (1972) 523–42 passim. For a dissenting interpretation, see S. Jacobs, ‘Laws of nature, corpuscles and concourse: Non-occasionalist tendencies in the natural philosophy of Robert Boyle’, Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994) 369–89. For Newtonians who accepted a ‘scholastic’ interpretation of gravity, see Hutchison, ‘Individualism and causal location’, pp. 342, 350 n.48.
For Descartes, see Philosophical Works, v.l, pp. 105, 158, 301–2, v.2, pp. 77–8; for Glanvill, see: Glanvill, Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion, [1676]. Facs. reprint edn (New York, 1970) pp. 20–1; H. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630–1690 (The Hague, 1963) pp. 85–6.
This is the central thesis of K. Hutchison, ‘What happened to occult qualities in the Scientific Revolution?’, Isis 73 (1982) 233–53.
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Hutchison, K. (2000). The Natural, the Supernatural, and the Occult in the Scholastic Universe. In: Freeland, G., Corones, A. (eds) 1543 and All That. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9478-3_9
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