Abstract
(Preliminary note : The reflection on the phenomenon of temporality that I am developing here was originally done with the playing of actual sound samples. Reading the written exposition without the actual sound and trying to compensate with merely imagined examples would make the exercise too abstract; for imagination is always, even if inadvertently, selective, following what one already knows or expects. Imagined samples are not charged with the kind of resistance to or controverting of presupposed features that “a thing itself’ can possess. It is recommended, therefore, that one try to display to oneself actual sound samples like the ones indicated in order to present” the phenomenon itself’ that is being examined. This goes as well for the shift in the kind of phenomena presented that enters as the analysis proceeds, the shift from samples of sound to one of light.)
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Literatur
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K.Smith (London: Macmillan, 1958), 77 (A33–34/B49–50).
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erste Buch, 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana IH/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 180–181 [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 192].
Husserl’s only published work on the phenomenology of time [Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917), ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); English translation: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), trans. John Barnett Brough, Edmund Husserl, Collected Works, vol. 4 (Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991 )], celebrated but still preliminary, gives musical tone and melody as its first example (§3). And does so in keeping with the tendency of the period (see the footnotes to §7), no doubt as the long echoing aftermath of Hegel’s explanation of music as the art which has time as its medium [see G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, trans. F.P.B Osmaston (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1920, Vol 3, 364, in the chapter on music). And Husserl returns to music as the exemplar of temporalization, for example, in the C-MSS, e.g. C 3 HI, 30.
Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 176.
Heinrich Schenker, Free Composition, Vol. EL of New Musical Theories and Fantasies, trans. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), xxiii. For the Schopenhauerian element in Schenker’s theoretical standpoint, which this quote suggests, especially in relation to the Viennese context of Schenker’s work, see Nicholas Cook, “Schenker’s Theory of Music as Ethics,” The Journal ofMusicology, vol. 7 #4 (Fall 1989), 415–439, section m (420–424).
Bergson, The Creative Mind, 176. This section of the book is entitled “The perception of change.”
It can also be argued that the diagram misses even the horizonality of the horizons, simply by virtue of the fact that the horizon is represented in terms of determinate content-items, as if horizonality as such were entirely equivalent to a totality of items in a horizon. For more on this see Bruzina, “La structure phénoménologique du monde, une révision,” Les Cahiers de Philosophie, 1992, No. 15/16,89–110.
For more on this, see Bruzina, “The Revision of the Bernau Time-Consciousness Manuscripts: Status Quaestionis—Freiburg, 1928–1930,” Alter, No.1. (1993), 357–383 (hereafter „Bernau: Status Quaestionis”), and “The Revision of the Bernau Time-Consciousness Manuscripts: New Ideas—Freiburg, 1930–1933,” Alter No. 2 (1994), 367–395 (hereafter “Revision: New Ideas”).
On all this, see “Revision: Status Quaestionis,” pp. 369–371, and “Revision: New Ideas,” 368–381. HusserPs term “de-actualization” is used in Bernau manuscripts L I 15/38a (designation in the Husserl Archives), B-II 314 (designation in the Eugen-Fink-Archiv). See “Revision: Status Quaestionis,” 370.
Again, for a fuller explication of this way of articulating the structure of temporality see my article “Revision: New Ideas,” 376ff.
Querintentionalität and Längsintentionalität are, of course, Husserl’s terms in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §39. Entgegenwärtigung is Fink’s expression (see “Revision: New Ideas,” 368ff.).
Again, see “Revision: Status Quaestionis,” 367ff.
This is Husserl’s term. See the texts and treatment in “Revision Status Quaestionis,” 369–371.
On Husserl’s realization of this in the Bernau manuscripts, see “Revision: Status Quaestionis,” 366ff.
Here one must be careful not to confuse a) the consciousness that is the self-feeling intrinsic to the movements of sensitive life, the internal awareness intrinsic to an organism’s own workings which humans and animals have in their living actions and responses, and b) the consciousness of something non-self precisely as an impinging or passing it, the consciousness of perceptual awareness. The temporality at issue in my paper, and in the phenomenology of “the consciousness of internal time” is the latter, not the former. The latter is the temporality ofappearing, the time of the phenomenality of the world, not the temporality of internally felt sensitive organic living. To the extent that the kind of awareness at play in felt organic living (i.e., felt time as against the time of phenomenality) would not sustain being characterized in terms of noetic-noematic structure, the issue of how there is in it an awareness of its time is another problem. It may be in time without being aware at all of time. This, too, is a matter left aside here.
See „Revision: New Ideas,” 380ff.
Eugen-Fink-Archiv Z-IX 33a and Z-VI 26a. Again, see the treatment in “Revision: New Ideas,” 381.
„Wenn die Gegenwartserinnerung eine Vergegenwärtigung ist, so muß die ihr zugrunde liegende Entgegenwärtigung aufweisbar sein. Damit stoßen wir an die Problematik des Raumes. Gegenwartserinnerungen sind nur phänomenologisch aufklärbar aus einer Fundamentalanalyse des Raumes. Damit zeigt sich der ‘Raum’ als die 4.Dimension der Zeit. M.a.W. die Analyse der ‘Zeitlichkeit’ sofern sie Zeitlichkeit des Erlebnisstromes sein soll, transcendentale Zeit, ist gar nicht ablösbar vom Moment des ‘Raumes’. Die ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit als der Seinssinn der transcendentalen Subjektivität ist immer räumlich. Bei Husserl ist die ganze Bedeutung des Raummoments als integraler Bestand der Zeit immer gesehen.“ Eugen-Fink-Archiv Z-VI 26a.
Hua X, 75 (§36); English translation: 79.
“In diesem Sinne ist es also nicht ein ‘Seiendes’, sondern das Gegenstück zu allem Seienden, nicht ein Gegenstand, sondern Urständ für alle Gegenständlichkeit. Das Ich sollte eigentlich nicht das Ich heissen, sondern sollte überhaupt nicht ‘heissen’, da es dann schon Gegenstand geworden ist; es ist das Namenlose, über allem nicht stehende, nicht schwebende, sondern ‘fungierende’ als fassend, wertend u.s.w. Das alles muß zwar noch viel tiefer übertdacht werden, es liegt fast an der Grenze möglicher Beschreibung.“ Eugen-Fink-Archiv B-II247–248. Here Fink’s transcription modifies Husserl’s wording. What Husserl wrote originally as the final sentences of Husserl Archives L 120/4a is as follows: “In diesem Sinne ist es also nicht ‘Seiendes’, sondern Gegenstück für alles Seiende, nicht ein Gegenstand, sondern Urständ für alle Gegenständlichkeit. Das Ich sollte eigentlich nicht das Ich heissen, und überhaupt nicht heisseyi, da es dann schon gegenständlich geworden ist, es ist das Namenlose über allem Fassbaren, über allem nicht Stehende, nicht Schwebende, nicht Seiende, sondern ‘Fungierende’, als fassend, als wertend usw. [The last sentence, which Fink inserts here, is a marginal addition by Husserl at the beginning of L I 20/4b:] Das allem muß was noch viel tiefer überdacht werden. Es liegt fast an der Grenze möglicher Beschreibung.“ LI20/4a-b. Emphases are all in the cited texts themselves, while the second insertion in brackets is meant to represent a little of the telling contrast in the play of wording in the German. (Also: In Husserl’s case, the underlining in the transcription represents a restricted selection from all kinds of underlinings that Husserl has in the shorthand original.) Finally, next to this passage Husserl writes a most interesting remark that Fink does not include in his transcription: “ ‘Seiendes’ als individuell Seiendes, an Zeitstelle Gebundene und durch sie Individualisiertes. Das Ich so nicht ‘seiend’.“ Again, see the treatment in “Revision: Status Quaestionis,” pp.363ff.
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Bruzina, R. (2000). There Is More to the Phenomenology of Time than Meets the Eye. In: Brough, J.B., Embree, L. (eds) The Many Faces of Time. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9411-0_4
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