Abstract
The simple response to the question raised in the title of this essay is: in no sense. But that response, though direct, is surely too abrupt. To understand why one might wish to class Averroes among the encyclopedists, it is necessary to think carefully about the whole of his writings and to compare them with those works of his predecessors that are more readily classed among encyclopedic writings. An attempt must also be made to unravel what Averroes saw himself as doing in his many commentaries on Aristotle, not to mention on Alghazali, and in his legal as well as his political writings. Thus, the goal here is to ferret out Averroes’s guiding or principal purpose in his manifold writings.
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References
See Father M. Bouyges, S. J., “Notes sur les philosophes Arabes connus des Latins au Moyen Age,” Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université Saint-Joseph 7 (1911–1921): 399–404,
See Father M. Bouyges, S. J., “Notes sur les philosophes Arabes connus des Latins au Moyen Age,” Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université Saint-Joseph 8 (1922): 3–54, and
See Father M. Bouyges, S. J., “Notes sur les philosophes Arabes connus des Latins au Moyen Age,” Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université Saint-Joseph 9 (1924): 43–8;
also Harry A. Wolfson, “Plan for the Publication of a Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem,” Speculum 6 (1931): 412–27, and
also Harry A. Wolfson, “Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem,” Speculum 38 (1963): 88–104.
See Father Georges C. Anawati, Mu’allifât Ihn Rushd (Algiers, 1978);
Philipp W. Rosemann, “Averroes: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 Onwards,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 30 (1988): 153–221;
and Jamal al-Dîn al-‘Alawî, al-Matn al-Rushdî, madkhalli-qirâ’ah jadîdah (Casablanca, 1986).
One might also profitably consult Father Georges C. Anawati, “Bilan des études sur la philosophie médiévale en terre d’Islam, 1982–1987,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 29 (1987): 24–47;
and Charles E. Butterworth, “The Study of Arabie Philosophy Today,” plus “Appendix (1983–87),” in Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, ed. Thérèse-Anne Druart (Washington, 1988), pp. 55–140. The bibliography that accompanied the publication of Multiple Averroès (Paris, 1978), and the two printed under the imprimatur of the Thomas-Institut in the Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, are fraught with difficulties.
See the article “Encyclopédie,” in Diderot, Encyclopédie III (LETTRES D-L), ed. John Lough and Jacques Proust (Paris, 1976), 174–262. The quotation is from 174 (emphasis in the original).
ibid., 179–80.
ibid., 180.
ibid., 232–3.
Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Discours préliminaire de l’encyclopédie (Paris, 1965), 18–9.
For a fuller account of this perspective, see my “Paris est et sagesse ouest: du Trivium et Quadrivium dans le monde arabe médiéval,” in L’Enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des Arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles), ed. Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (Bruxelles, 1997), 477–93.
The epistle has come down to us in a single manuscript—the famous Istanbul Aya Sofya 4832, fols. 27r–30r—and has been edited twice. See M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Atti della reale Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche eFilofogiche, serie VI, Vol. 6, 1937 [published in 1940] (XV), 375–403; and
M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Rasâ’il al-Kindî al-fahafiyyah (Philosophic Epistles of Alkindi), ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîdah (Cairo, 1950), 363–84. The references here are to the pages and lines of AbûRîdah’s better known and more easily obtainable edition.
M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Rasâ’il al-Kindî al-fahafiyyah (Philosophic Epistles of Alkindi), ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîdah (Cairo, 1950), 365,1. 2–369,1. 13, and 379,1. 4–384,1. 19.
M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Rasâ’il al-Kindî al-fahafiyyah (Philosophic Epistles of Alkindi), ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîdah (Cairo, 1950), 369,1. 14–370,1. 8.
M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Rasâ’il al-Kindî al-fahafiyyah (Philosophic Epistles of Alkindi), ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîdah (Cairo, 1950), 370,11. 7–8
M. Guidi and R. Walzer, “Studi su al-Kindî I: Uno scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,” in Rasâ’il al-Kindî al-fahafiyyah (Philosophic Epistles of Alkindi), ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîdah (Cairo, 1950), 372, 11. 9–16. See also Alkindi’s Kitâb al-Kindî fî al-falsafah al-ûlâ (Alkindi’s Book on First Philosophy) in Rasâ’il, 106,1. 5–107,1. 10.
Risâlah fî kammiyyah, 372,1. 16–373,1. 11.
See Alfarabi, Iḥṣâ al-’ulûm, ed. ‘Uthmân Amîn (Cairo, 1949), 43,1. 4.
ibid., 43,11. 11–14.
ibid., 104,1. 10–105,1. 1; see also 102,1. 3–104,1. 9.
ibid., 105,11. 2–7; see also 105,1. 8–107,1. 4.
ibid., 108,1. 10–110,1. 14.
Nowhere in the writings of Alfarabi is there an explicit definition of human happiness. To be sure, he repeatedly affirms that the supreme ruler knows what true happiness is and orders the opinions and actions of the citizens so that they might attain it. He even suggests what the ruler needs to know about the universe and human beings in order to gain an understanding of true happiness. Moreover, again and again, he explains what it is not, namely, wealth, pleasure, or honor. Perhaps Alfarabi’s silence arises from a reluctance to give foolish or ill-willed people occasion to trouble the public. In all of his writings, he insists upon the importance of citizens holding fast to received opinions lest useful restraints be jettisoned. Moreover, he demonstrates sufficient awareness of what is good for human beings as individuals and as members of a political community to urge particular conduct and opinions: it is evident, for example, that moderation, liberality, justice, and courage are good for human beings. It is also evident how these must be modified depending upon different circumstances. Similarly, uncertainty about the ultimate ends of human existence or the whole character of the universe notwithstanding, Alfarabi shows that certain opinions and actions are salutary and to be encouraged while others are nefarious and to be shunned. Because such opinions and actions are sound, they need to be adopted. That they are not justified in any final sense, that they do not lead to a full and detailed definition of happiness, is less important than the obvious fact that they further what is most essential for human well-being, namely, the pursuit of reason. Above all, the opinions Alfarabi does urge upon the inhabitants of communities he terms virtuous are such as to permit, even to prompt, investigation and reflection. They are such as to preserve the possibility of philosophy within a political sphere open to, perhaps even guided by, revelation.
See Abû’Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Yûsuf al-Khwârizmî, al-Kâtib, Kitâb mafâtîḥ al-’ulûm, ed. G. van Vloten (Leiden, 1895), 4,11. 6–11.
ibid., 2,1. 9–3,1.6.
ibid., 5,11. 3–6.
ibid., 5,11. 6–8.
The third chapter of this second treatise is devoted to the terms used in medicine, one of the natural sciences. Then, alerting the reader that the mathematical sciences of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music will be discussed in chapters four to seven, al-Khwârizmî explains that he has allotted a special chapter to mechanics since it has nothing to do with the other mathematical sciences (133, 11. 12–13). The terms used in chemistry are explained in the last chapter. Though al-Khwârizmî notes how chemistry is part of the natural sciences insofar as it examines metals (133, 11. 7–8), he says nothing to explain why its presentation is separated from the other natural science discussed here —medicine.
ibid., 132,1. 16–133,1.2.
ibid., 140,11. 9–10.
See Avicenna, Kitâb al-shifâ’, al-Manṭiq, al-madkhal, (The Book of Healing, Logic, Introduction), ed. G. Anawati, M. el-Khodeiri, and F. el-Ahwani (Cairo, 1952), 9,11. 7–10.
See ibid.y 10, 11. 8–13. Neither of these books—Kitâb al-lawâḥiq (Book of Corollaries) or al-Falsafah al-mashriqiyyah (Oriental Philosophy)—has come down to us. Yet another work, the Kitâb al-Najâh, fi al-ḥikmah al-manṭiqiyyah wa-al-ṭabî’iyyah xva-al-ilâhiyyah (Book of Salvation, On Logical, Natural, and Divine Wisdom), no editor (Cairo, 1938), is merely a summary of subjects treated in the Healing.
Kitâb al-shifâ’, al-Manṭiq, al-madkhal, (11,11. 12–13; see also 11,11. 1–11.
The epistle is to be found on 103–18 of the collection Tis’ rasa il (Nine Epistles), no editor (Cairo, 1908).
Fî aqsâm al-’ulûm, 107,1. 15–108,1. 2.
See ibid., 108,11. 2–3.
ibid., 108,11. 3–6.
ibid., 108,11. 6–10.
ibid., 112,1. 12–114,1. 8, and 114,1. 9–116,1. 9.
There is a maddening tendency on the part of Avicenna to be imprecise in his terminology. At first glance, such imprecision seems merely stylistic. Avicenna writes with more flair than Alfarabi and uses a far more extensive vocabulary, so it is only to be expected that he would use as synonyms words that usually have quite distinct meanings. One should, then, not pay undue attention to such imprecision—or should one? In the Introduction, for example, when distinguishing between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, Avicenna greatly emphasizes the different ends of each pursuit. The end of theoretical philosophy, according to him, is “the perfection of the soul so that it knows, period.” That of practical philosophy, on the other hand, is “the perfection of the soul, not so that it knows, period, but so that it knows what is to be done and then does it” (12, 11. 7–9). That is all very well, but a problem arises when immediately afterwards Avicenna summarizes what he has just advanced. As he puts it: “The end of the theoretical is belief in an opinion, not action; and the end of the practical is knowledge of an opinion having to do with action. The theoretical, then, is more appropriately linked with opinion.” (12,11. 9–10) If opinion is the end of both of these pursuits—albeit opinion not concerned with action when theoretical philosophy is at issue and opinion concerned with action with respect to practical philosophy—it does not seem possible for Avicenna to argue for philosophy ever having certainty about the conclusions it reaches. Yet he does just that. The problem is that he does so on highly questionable grounds. Having indicated the kinds of subjects investigated by theoretical and practical philosophy, Avicenna makes a most unusual assertion: The correctness of the sum of all of that is verified by theoretical demonstration and by legal testimony, while its details and its value are verified by the divine law. (14,11. 15–16) (Incidentally, the term “legal testimony” [al-shahâdah al-shar’iyyah] could also be rendered—given the root of the adjective modifying testimony—as “divine legal testimony.”) And in the very next sentence he sets forth as an obvious conclusion from what he has just advanced that “the end of theoretical philosophy is knowledge of the truth, and the end of practical philosophy is knowledge of the good” (14,11. 17–18). But what reasoning allows him to move from belief and opinion to demonstration, not to mention legal testimony? And what is the relationship between demonstration and legal testimony? Are we to infer that they are identical or that one can stand for the other? Finally, why does the divine law vouchsafe for the details and merit of the subjects investigated in theoretical and practical philosophy? Clearly, an answer to these questions will shed great light on the link Avicenna discerns between practical philosophy and divine science and especially between pagan Greek philosophy and the revelation accorded the prophet of Islam.
See Averroes, The Book of the Decisive Treatise, Determining the Connection Between the Laxv and Wisdom, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (forthcoming), sections 16–36 and 37. Alghazali had contended that Alfarabi and Avicenna were unbelievers because of their teachings about the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge (or, more precisely, ignorance) of particulars, and the resurrection of bodies as well as the life to come generally. To counter that accusation, it was necessary for Averroes to discuss these issues and thus to delve into subjects he considered too recondite for most citizens.
See Averroes, Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (forthcoming), “Introduction,” sec. 1.
See Averroes, al-Jawâmi’ fî al-falsafah, Kitâb al-samâ’ al-ṭabî’î, ed. Josep Puig (Madrid, 1983), 7,1.7–8,1. 14.
See Averroes, Epitome of the Metaphysics, ed. ‘ûthmân Amîn, as Talkhîṣ mâ ba’d al-ṭabî’ah (Cairo, 1958), 1,11. 5–9.
See Averroes, Tafsîr mâ ba’d al-ṭabîah, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S. J. (Beirut, 1967), Vol. 1,4,1. 12–5,1.7.
See Averroes on Plato’s “Republic,” trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca, New York, 1974), 21, 1. 21–22, 1. 6. These references, found in the margin of Lerner’s translation, refer to the page and line numbers of the Hebrew text in Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s “Republic,” ed. and trans., E. I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge, 1956).
See Averroes on Plato’s “Republic,” 53,1. 9–59,1. 13, esp. 54,11. 5–14 and 58,11. 3–14.
See ibid., 64,1. 28–74,1. 12; also 75,1. 27–77,1. 12 and 78,1. 25–79,1. 24.
See Averroes, al-Ḍarûrî fî uṣûl al-fiqh aw mukhtaṣar al-mustasfâ, ed. Jamal al-Dîn al-’Alawî (Beirut, 1994), 34,11. 4–7.
See Averroes, Bidâyat al-mujtahid xva-nihâyat al-muqtaṣid, ed ‘Abd al-Ḥalîm Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥalîm and ‘Abd al-Raḥmân Ḥasan Maḥmûd (Cairo, 1975), Vol. 1,15,11.4–10.
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Butterworth, C.E. (2000). In What Sense is Averroes an Encyclopedist?. In: Harvey, S. (eds) The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy. Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9389-2_5
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