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The Passion for Reason

  • Aleksander Peczenik
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 41)

Abstract

Moral values play a great role in legal argumentation and decision making. To be sure, both are based on such institutional sources as statutes, precedents, legislative history etc. Yet, even justice is obviously relevant in legal reasoning. This has been the case since times immemorial, e.g. in Rome (where the common law, ius gentium was supposed to express justice), England (law and equity) and also Scandinavia (“lov” and “dom”). In modem law, the statutes are sometimes “read” in the way alien to a layman, in order to obtain reasonable decisions.

Keywords

Prima Facie Legal Rule Legal Theory Legal Norm Legal Reasoning 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aleksander Peczenik
    • 1
  1. 1.Unversity of LundSweden

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