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True and False Logics of Scientific Discovery

  • Jaakko Hintikka
Chapter
Part of the Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers book series (HISP, volume 5)

Abstract

This paper is a first step in a larger enterprise. The ultimate aim of my enterprise is to uncover the logical structures, in a strict sense of the word “logic”, typically involved in scientific enterprise, not just in the justification of already obtained results but in the acquisition of new information.

Keywords

Scientific Discovery Statement View True Logic Scientific Enterprise Abstract Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. (1).
    See T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second ed., The University of Chicago Press, 1970;Google Scholar
  2. (1a).
    T.S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, The University of Chicago Press, 1977;Google Scholar
  3. (1b).
    Gary Cutting, editor, Paradigms and Revolutions; Applications and Appraisals of Science, University of Notre Dama Press, Notre Dame, 1980;Google Scholar
  4. (1c).
    Ian Hacking, editor, Scientific Revolutions (Oxford Readings in Philosophy), Oxford U.P., 1981.Google Scholar
  5. (2a).
    See J.D. Sneed, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1971;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. (2).
    Wolfgang Stegmüller, Theorienstruktur und Theoriendynamik, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 1973;Google Scholar
  7. (2b).
    Wolfgang Stegmüller, Theory Construction, Structure, and Rationality, Springer-Verlag, 1979. Useful surveys of the tradition Sneed and Stegmüller started are Ilkka Niiniluoto, The Growth of Theories: Comments on the Structuralist Approach in Jaakko Hintikka et al., editors, Theory Change Ancient Axiomatics, and Galileo’s Methodology, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980, pp. 3–47; and Ilkka Niiniluoto, “Scientific Progress”, Synthese vol. 45 (1980), pp. 427–462.Google Scholar
  8. (3).
    See Erkenntnis vol. 10, no 2 (July 1976), with contributions by Sneed, Stegmüller, and Kuhn.Google Scholar
  9. (4).
    Cf. Dana Scott and Peter Krauss, “Assigning Probabilities to Logical Formulas” in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes, editors, Aspects of Indicative Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 219–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. (5).
    See David Pearce and Veikko Rantala, “On a New Approach to Metascience”, Reports from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1–42 (with further references).Google Scholar
  11. (6).
    Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959;Google Scholar
  12. (6a).
    Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1963;Google Scholar
  13. (6b).
    Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford U.P., 1972;Google Scholar
  14. (6c).
    P.A. Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of Karl Popper I–II, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., 1974.Google Scholar
  15. (7).
    See Jaakko Hintikka and Juhani Pictarinen, “Semantic Information and Inductive Logic” in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes, editors, Aspects of Inductive Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 96–112; Jaakko Hintikka, “Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation”, in B. van Rootselaar and J.F. Staal, editors, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science III: Proceedings of the 1967 Congress, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968. Of course we have to restrict our attention to a relevant range of hypotheses, but there is nothing ad hoc about such restrictions.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. (8).
    Cf., e.g., Lester E. Dubins and Leonard J. Savage, How To Gamble If You Must: Inequalities for Stochastic Processes, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965.Google Scholar
  17. (9).
    Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977;Google Scholar
  18. (9a).
    Larry Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981;Larry Laudan, “A Problem-solving Approach to Scientific Progress” in Ian Hacking, editor (note 1 above).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. (10).
    Jaakko Hintikka, The Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 28, no. 4), Helsinki, 1976; “New Foundations for a Theory of Questions and Answers”, forthcoming; “Questions with Outside Quantifiers” in Robinson Schneider et al., editors, Papers from the Parasession on Nondeclaratives, Chicago Linguistics Society, Chicago, 1982, pp. 83–92.Google Scholar
  20. (11).
    E. W. Beth, “Semantic Entailment and Formal Derivability”, Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.R. vol. 18, no. 13, Amsterdam, 1955, pp. 309–342; reprinted in Jaakko Hintikka, editor, Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford U.P., 1969, pp. 9–41.Google Scholar
  21. (12).
    One can construe a tableau construction as an attempt to construct a model set in which the entries in the left tableau column are all included but which does not contain any entries in the right tableau column. If you turn a closed tableau upside down you obtain a Gentzen-type proof of the desired sequent.Google Scholar
  22. (13).
    Richard Robinson, “Begging the Question 1971”, Analysis, vol. 31 (1971), pp. 113–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. (14).
    If my questioning games are thought of as research games against nature, the motivation of this restriction is clear. Nature can directly tell us what is true or false in particular cases, not whether some complicated sentence involving nested quantifiers is true or false.Google Scholar
  24. (15).
    Cf. R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940;Google Scholar
  25. (15a).
    R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939;Google Scholar
  26. (15b).
    Michael Krausz, “The Logic of Absolute Presuppositions” in Michael Krausz, editor, Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 222–240.Google Scholar
  27. (16).
    This is shown by the existence of theories which are model-complete but not complete. Cf., e.g. Abraham Robinson, Introduction to Model Theory and to the Metamathematics of Algebra, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1963.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaakko Hintikka
    • 1
  1. 1.Boston UniversityUSA

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