Abstract
The overall character of the ideas Thomas S. Kuhn has offered concerning the nature of scientific inquiry has been generally misunderstood, or, rather, misconstrued. (See Kuhn 1957, 1970.) Kuhn’s ideas do not add up to a fully articulated analysis of the structure of the scientific process. Kuhn does not offer a theory of science which should be evaluated in the same way as, e.g., the hypothetico-deductive model of science or the inductivist one. What Kuhn does is best viewed as calling our attention to certain salient phenomena which a philosophical theorist of science must try to understand and to account for. We do injustice to Kuhn if we deal with his views as if they were finished products of philosophical theorizing. They are not. Rather, they are starting-points for such theorizing;, they pose problems to be solved by a genuine theory of science.
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Hintikka, J. (1999). Theory-Ladenness of Observations as as Test Case of Kuhn’s Approach to Scientific Inquiry. In: Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery. Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9313-7_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9313-7_12
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