Abstract
Since the early 1930s industrial sectors have seen private codes, charters, selfcommitments etc. emitted by private sources spring up.1 Because they are not generated by law or the Authorities but by private sources, they belong to the self-regulation processes which are becoming increasingly common in industry. One may wonder about their effective enforcement power which could appear, at first sight, quite weak. Hence, lawyers speak of ‘soft law’ or ‘green laws’. Concretely, the nature of private codes is multiple: they may be limited to a selfcommitment (firm’s individual charter), or may bind together firms from the same or different sector of activity.2
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Mondello, G. (1999). Environmental Industrial Regulation and the Private Codes Question. In: Carraro, C., Lévêque, F. (eds) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9311-3_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9311-3_8
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