Abstract
The primary concern of logic is inference; and in particular, the question of what constitutes a valid inference. In investigating this issue, a certain class of notions has always appeared to be of crucial importance. We now call them logical constants, though they have been called by different names at different times. (For example, they were called syncategoremata by medieval logicians.) Much of logic has therefore been devoted to an analysis of these notions. Historically, the most contentious have been the quantifiers and the conditional. Consensus concerning the former has been achieved this century, due to the work of Frege and others. The debate concerning the latter shows no similar sign of convergence.
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Priest, G. (1999). What Not? A Defence of Dialetheic Theory of Negation. In: Gabbay, D.M., Wansing, H. (eds) What is Negation?. Applied Logic Series, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_6
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