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Negation As Falsity: A Reply to Tennant

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Part of the book series: Applied Logic Series ((APLS,volume 13))

Abstract

What is negation? In the present paper it is argued that negation can be regarded as a hinge between provability and disprovability (refutability). This notion of negation as falsity is developed against the background of Neil Tennant’s arguments in favour of negation in intuitionistic relevant logic. It is shown that negation in intuitionistic relevant logic is a negation as syntactical inconsistency in the sense of Dov Gabbay, and that every such negation as inconsistency is a negation as falsity, while the converse is not true.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Wansing, H. (1999). Negation As Falsity: A Reply to Tennant. In: Gabbay, D.M., Wansing, H. (eds) What is Negation?. Applied Logic Series, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5169-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9309-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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