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Value-Free Worlds and Value-Imposing Minds. Representational Practices and the Constructivist Argument

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Hermeneutics and Science

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 206))

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Abstract

A central point of inquiry pursued in this study concerns the locus and genesis of “meaning” and, thus, in some ways the “ontology of meaning” applicable in a wide range of very different levels of organization observable to humans. We use the term “meaning” or “meaningful” both when we talk about inherently meaningful (information) structures and also when we talk about figurative or symbolic meanings of an interpersonal character, the latter obviously being a result of intentional human creation and symbol manipulation of an inferential nature. For the purpose of a transparent exposition of my arguments, I propose to distinguish — in the discussion to follow — between inherent meanings and inferred/assumed/imposed meanings, though I do realize that this terminological choice could easily lead to some misinterpretations if taken outside the limited context of this paper.

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Komlósi, L.I. (1999). Value-Free Worlds and Value-Imposing Minds. Representational Practices and the Constructivist Argument. In: Fehér, M., Kiss, O., Ropolyi, L. (eds) Hermeneutics and Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 206. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9293-2_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9293-2_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5257-5

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