Abstract
In my opinion, what is prejudicial to the present debate on hermeneutics in science is an inadequate notion of science, rather than an inadequate notion of hermeneutics. Present science is so complex and wide in scope that rightly philosophers look for a version of it reduced to synthetic notions. Of course, it is a hard task to characterize science in a synthetic and at the same time adequate way. The traditional, dominant attitude among scientists is to reply by presenting science according to a peculiar ideal, i.e. as a strictly deductive system which includes the most powerful mathematics possible. As a natural consequence, many artifacts, in my opinion, follow, to qui pro quo’s.
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Bibliography and Notes
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To my knowledge, the best analysis of his method is the book: J. Bondurant: Conquest of Violence, California U.P., Berkeley, 1965.
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Drago, A. (1999). Incommensurability as a Bound of Hermeneutics in Science. In: Fehér, M., Kiss, O., Ropolyi, L. (eds) Hermeneutics and Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 206. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9293-2_12
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