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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 39))

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Abstract

The objects of the study of law are: (1) meanings of (legal) texts, (2) (legal) experiences, (3) (legal) behavior, and (4) (legal) values. Various theories of law dissent as to the ontological character of these objects and their mutual relations. There are “manylevelled” theories according to which all these objects are “the law” — legal objects of equal rank, and, “one — levelled” theories according to which only one of these objects is “law in the sense proper. The most important differences are to be noted between the theories based on objective idealism, and the realistic ones. On the author’s view there are two “levels” of law: that of phenomena, and that of meanings. An attempt at a realistic interpretation of these levels and their relations is made. There is also shown the connection of the philosophical problem of the complexity of law with the current methodological questions of the study of law.

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Notes

  1. E.g., comp. K.N. Llewellyn, “Law and social sciences — especially sociology”, Harvard Law Review 62, 1949; K. Opalek, “The study of law and the integration of social sciences”, paper presented at the International Symposium on Methodology of Law Sciences in Beograd, 1967 ( Symposium records ).

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  2. Comp. K. Opalek, “The peculiarities of the study of law and the problem of integration”, Archivum Iuridicum Cracoviense 1, 1968.

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  3. E.g., comp. The American jurisprudence reader,ed. by T.A. Cowan, N. Y. 1956, based on this division.

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  4. Comp. J. Stone, The province and function of law. Law as logic, justice and social control. A study in jurisprudence, Sydney 1946.

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  5. J. Wróblewski, “Methodological Problems of contemporary legal theory”, paper presented at the International Symposium on Methodology of Law Sciences in Beograd, 1967. Discussion on the current views and the author’s conception of levels of law.

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  6. One of the eminent propounders of this discipline was L. Petrazycki comp. esp. his Wstep do nauki polityki prawn (Introduction to the science of legal politics),orig. Russian ed. 1896-97, Polish ed. Warszawa 1968: comp. the discussion on legal politics by A. Ross, On Law and Justice,London 1958, eh. ch. 14-16.

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  7. Comp. J. Wróblewski, op. cit.; A. Peczenik, “Plaszczyzny badania prawa” (The levels of the study of law), Paristwo i Prawo (State and Law) 2, 1968; K. Opalek, Problemy metodologiczne nauki prawa (Methodological problems of the study of law,), Warszawa 1962. Part. I.

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  8. Comp. R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity,II ed., Chicago 1958, eh. I, esp. § 6.

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  9. Comp. A. Ross, op. cit. § 0 13.

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  10. E.g. it is easy to notice in J. Lande’s conception of levels of law, in Studia z filozofii prawa (Studies in legal philosophy),Warszawa 1959, esp. pp. 671 f., 678 (in the paper “Sprawa teorii prawa” — The Question of legal theory, 1933, reprinted there).

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  11. See the discussion by J. Wolenski, ‘Spór o znaczenie normatywne’ (Contention on the subject of normative meaning) in Naturalistyczne i antynaturalistyczne interpretacje humanistyki (The naturalistic and antinaturalistic interpretations of humanities),Poznan 1966; as to the ordinary language approach — C. Wellman, the language of ethics, Cambridge Mass. 1961, pp. 129 if.

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  12. Comp. critically L. Petrazycki, Wstep do nauki prawn i morahlosci (Introduction into the study of law and morals),Polish ed. Warszawa 1959, § 2.

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  13. Comp. the discussion by. W. Lang, Obowigzywanie prawa (The validity of law) Warszawa 1962, Part. II, eh. III.

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  14. Comp. J. Lande, op. cit. pp. 913 f; but similarly in quite a number of theories.

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  15. Comp. the discussion (but also the author’s own conception adopting, with certain modifications, the same view) in W. Lang, “Czy istnieje zjawisko prawne?” (Does the legal phenomenon exist?), Przeglqd Polski i Obcy (Polish and Foreign Revue), 1958, 6.

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  16. A. Ross, Towards a realistic jurisprudence. A criticism of the dualism in law, Copenhagen 1946, p. 43.

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  17. Comp. on this point the analyses by L. Petratycki, Introduction…,pp. 47 fI:

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  18. The most famous and elaborated theory of this pattern is, of course, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. We cannot refer here in detail to the numerous and widely discussed writings of this author.

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  19. The classical example here is Petratycki’s Psychological Theory of Law [comp. this author’s principal work, Teoria prawa i parristwa w zwiazku z teoriq moralnosci (Theory of law and state in connection with the theory of morals),2 volumes, Polish ed. Warszawa 1959-60]. As to the points mentioned here, comp. the criticism by K. Opalek, Teoria Petraiyckiego a wspolczesna teoria prawa (Petra2ycki’s theory and contemporary legal theory) in coll. Leona Petraiyckiego teoria prawa i teoria nauki (Leon Petrazyckis theory of law and of science),Warszawa 1969. The problem of “understanding” in the case of norms is not an easy one; comp. e.g. the discussion by M. Black in Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy,Ithaca 1962, pp. 120 if.

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  20. Comp. criticism by A. Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence…,pp. 59 ff.; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, pp. 132 f£; K. Opalek, J. Wróblewski, Wspólczesna teoria i socjologia prawa w USA (The contemporary theory and sociology of law in USA),Warszawa 1963, ch. III.

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  21. K. Opalek, Methodological problems…,ch. II, § 2.

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  22. A classical example of a conception of this kind is nowadays that of C. Cossio, comp. La teoria egologica del derecho y el concepto juridico de libertad,II ed. Buenos Aires I964.

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  23. Comp. A. Peczenik, op. cit., p. 232.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Woleński, J. (1999). The Complexity of Law and of the Methods of its Study. In: Woleński, J. (eds) Kazimierz Opałek Selected Papers in Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_4

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