Abstract
In considerations on the functions of law sociological, psychological, and social-philosophical problems prevail. Attention should be paid, however, also to peculiarities of the normative discourse legal in particuliar, composed of linguistic expressions functioning as acts of influencing behaviour, and belonging to a larger group of verbal acts of “doing things”. The most important contribution to the theory of such acts seems to be that of J.L. Austin. In this paper we shall examine the possibilities offered by Austin’s work to the study of functions of legal discourse, while attempting at making the said theory more precise and at supplementing it by the findings of the theory of law (and of the theory of norms in general). This seems worth trying the more so as so far the subject of pragmatic functions of legal expressions has remained almost untouched upon.
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Notes
W. Cerf, “Critical review of How to Do Things with Words”, in Symposium on J.L. Austin, ed. K.T. Fann, London, 1969, pp. 370 f, 379. Comp. Austin’s qualification of his own work as “linguistic phenomenology”, “Plea of excuses” in Philosophical Papers, Oxford, 1961, p. 130.
L.J. Cohen, “Do illocutionary forces exist?”, Symposium...,p. 439.
W. Cerf, op.cit., p. 366 f.
L.J. Cohen, op.cit., p. 420; M. Black, “Austin on performatives”, Symposium...,p. 409 f.
M. Black, op.cit., p. 410.
L.W. Ferguson, “In pursuit of performatives”, Symposium...,p. 419.
Published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supl. Vol. XX, pp. 148–187.
Comp., e.g., K. Olivecrona, “Legal language and reality”, Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound,Cambridge Mass, 1963, esp. pp. 174, ff.
In his Harvard lectures (posthumous ed. by J.O. Urmson, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford, 1962 ).
Performative utterances“, in Philosophical Papers,cit. above.
M. Black, op.cit., p. 401.
How to do Things With Words,p. 132.
Ibid., p. 147.
Performative utterances, p. 238.
Comp. papers by W. Cerf, L.J. Cohen, M. Black, and L.W. Ferguson cit. above, and — in the same volume — those by M. Furberg, “Meaning and illocutionary force”, p. 445–468; P.F. Strawson, “Intenstion and convention in speech acts”, pp. 380–400, and R.M. Chisholm, Austin’s Philosophical Papers,pp. 101–126.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,Oxford, 1953, Section 23.
M. Black, op.cit., p. 411.
How to Do Things with Words, p. 8.
Ibidem p. 103.
P.F. Strawson, op.cit., p. 386.
How to Do Thigs with Words, pp. 150–162.
L.J. Cohen, op.cit., p. 441.
A. Ross, “The rise and fall of the doctrine of perfonnatives”, Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia,ed. by K.E. Olson and A.M. Parul, Baltimore and London, 1972, pp. 205 f., 208 f.
How to Do Things with Words,pp. 151, 161 f., and on this subject D. Holdcroft, Meaning and Illocutionary Acts. The theory of meaning,ed. by G.H.K. Parkinson, Oxford, 1970, pp. 178 f.
Similarly M. Black, op.cit., p. 407, but it is hard to accept, as a property of conventional acts in the sense discussed here that “The mere doing of the act in accordance with the standard conditions makes the actor liable to certain social consequences” (this would typically pertain only to the so-called commissives). This property has been called further by M. Black “claim-generating” (who, however, adds the remark, “an inadequate label”).
Comp.
Comp. How to Do Things with Words,pp. 14 ff
Comp. L. Nowak, S. Wronkowska, M. Zielinski, Z. Ziembinski, “Czynno§ci konwencjonalne w prawie” (Conventional acts in law), Studia prawnicze 33, 1972, pp. 73–99.
A. Ross, op.cit., pp. 209 tL Comp. his On Law and Justice,London, 1958 eh. IX.
Comp. A. Ross, “The rise and fall...”, p. 210; Z. Ziembihski, “Kompetencja i nor ma kompetencyjna” (Competence and norm of competence), Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny,4, 1969, esp., pp. 29 f.; K. Opalek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa (Problems of Legal Theory), Warszawa, 1969. eh. VI und VII.
Comp. A. Ross, “The rise and fall...”, p. 212.
Ibidem, p. 212.
How to Do Things with Words,p. 19.
The use of the terms “utterance” and “statement” by Austin presents some complications but this will not be entered into here.
K. Opalek, “The problem of `directive meaning—, Festkrift til Professor, Dr. funs et Phil. Alf Ross, Copenhagen, 1969; ”On the logical semantic structure of directives“, Logique et Analyse, pp. 49–50, 1970; ”Directives, optatives, and value statements“, Etudes de Logique juridique, Vol. V, 1973.
Categoric“ in contradistinction to ”hypothetical“ (= dependent in its fulfillment on the will of the addressee, as directives other than norms are): This division ought to be distingnished from ”conditional“ — ”unconditional“. Comp. M. Moritz, ”Über konditionale Imperative“, Festkrift till Professor, Dr. Junis et Phil. A. Ross,p. 352 f.
While paying no attention to norms, Austin (How to Do Things with Words,p. 162) stressed the importance of his theory for the analyses of the basic evaluative term “good”, comp. D. Holdcroft, op.cit. p. 166 f.
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Woleński, J. (1999). “Doing Things with Words” and the Law. In: Woleński, J. (eds) Kazimierz Opałek Selected Papers in Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_20
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