Abstract
This study is an attempt at a comparative analysis of directives, optatives, and value statements from the point of view of the philosophy of language. The standpoint represented here is that there are certain general features of language independent of those of the particular languages and that there are such general features specific of the area of the statements in question. Our approach to the problem of these features will not be an a priori one, we shall pay strict attention to the facts of natural languages while making resort to some reconstructionist devices.1 Vital syntactic-semantic problems will be involved here, but nevertheless, an important role has to be ascribed to the pragmatic analysis as a tool indispensable in dealing with statements of these particular kinds.
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Notes
Comp. the approach to the philosophy of language outlined by J.R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge 1969, ch. I.
Comp. A. Ross, Directives and Norms, London 1968, p. 1 f
R. Carnap, A. “Kaplan on value judgments”, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by P.A. Schilpp, La Salle-London 1963, p. 999 f.
K. Opatek, “The problem of `directive meaning”’, in Festskrift ti! Professor, Dr. Jur. et Phil. Alf Ross, Kobenhavn 1969, p. 405 f.
K. Opalek, “On the logical-semantic structure of directives”, Logique et Analyse XIII, 49–50, 1970, p. 188 ff.
A. Ross, op. cit., p. 120.
G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry, London 1963, p. 86.
A. Ross, op. cit., p. 123 f
K. Opalek, Prawo podmiotowe (The Subjective Law), Warszawa 1957, ch. III.
L. Petra2ycki, Teoria prawa i paristwa w zwiqzku z teoriq moralnosci (Theory of Law and State in Connection with Theory of Morals), Vol. I, Warszawa 1959, p. 70 ff.
Comp. S. Wronkowska, “O znaczeniu i socjotechnicznej roll terminu `czyje§ prawo”’ (“On the meaning and sociotechnical role of the term `somebody’s right”’), Paristwo i Prawo (State and Law), 6, 1969, p. 1079 if.
Comp. G.H. von Wright, An Essay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action, Amsterdam 1968, p. 13 f.
On some of the difficulties involved here comp. G.H. von Wright, “Deontic logic and the theory of conditions”, Critica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia II, 6, 1968, p. 4 f
It would seem hardly acceptable to regard, e.g., -W or -W-, as concepts analogous to permission.
They are discussed, to some extent, by A. Ross, op. cit., pp. 38–60, this being rather exceptional.
Comp. O. Weinrerger, “Die Sollsatzproblematik in der modernen Logik”, Rozpravy Ceskoslovenske Akademie Véd, 68, 9, 1958; N. Rescher, The Logic of Commands, London-New York 1966, eh. III; A. Ross, op. cit., p. 71 tT.
Comp., e.g., A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, Oxford 1955; A.R. Anderson, “The formal analysis of normative systems”, Techn. Rep. No 2, Contract No SAR/Nour — 609/16/, Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, New Haven 1956; G.H. von Wright, An Essay..., cit. above; E. Stenius, “The principles of a logic of normative systems”, Acta Philos. Fennica XVI, 1963, p. 248 f
Comp. e.g., C. Wellman, The Language of Ethics, Cambridge Mass. 1961, eh. II-V.
Comp. G.H. von Wright, “The logic of practical discourse”, in Contemporary Philosophy. A Survey, ed. by R. Klibansky, Firenze 1968, p. 143 f
Comp., phanomenologiseh begrandeten Rechts-und Staatslehre, Leipzig 1924, p. 102 f; K. Opalek, Prawo podmiotowe, cit. above, p. 284 II:
Comp. A.P. Brogan, “The fundamental values universal”, Jour. of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, XVI, 1919; S. Hallden, “On the logic of `better”’, Uppsala 1957; R.M. Chisholm, E. Sosa, “On the logic of `intrinsically better”’, Amer. Philosophical Quarterly III, 16, 1966; G.H. von Wright, “The logic of practical discourse”, cit. above, p. 144 f
Comp. J. Lande, Studia z filozofhi prawn (Studies in Legal Philosophy), Warszawa 1959, p. 765 ff.
The first attempt seems to be that of K. Menger, “A logic of the doubtful. On optative and imperative logic”, Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums, S. II, 1, 1939.
R. Carnap, op.cit., p. 1005.
R. Carnap, op. cit., p. 1001 f., 1011 f.
This matter is discussed below, II, 14.
The term “theme” adopted from A. Ross, op. cit., p. 107.
On the term “happening” comp. T. Kotarbinski, Elementy teorii poznania, logiki folmalnej i metodologii nauk, Lwów 1929, p. 61 f. In the sense accepted by us it is in common use in the doctrinal study of law.
The last term will be left undefined.
Comp. K. Opalek, “On the logical-semantic structure of directives”, cit. above, p. 191 f.
Comp. G.H. von Wright, An Essay..., cit. above, p. 16 (in comparison with the first construction of a system of deontic logic by this author, “Deontic logic”,Mind LX, 1951); comp. R. Ross’s concept of the “idea of topic”, op.cit., p. 9 ff., and discussion by K. Opalek, “On the logical-semantic structure of directives”, cit. above, p, 178 ff.
In order to simplify matters we shall not discuss in this connection the problem of the “fabulating discourse” (comp. A. Ross, op.cit., p. 29 f1) which could enter here.
According to T. Czetowski, Filozofia na rozdrozu (Philosophy on Crossroads), Warszawa 1965, p. 119 f. Value statements are modal statements of some particular sort.
Comp. W. Van Orman Quine, Elementary Logic, rev. ed., Cambridge Mass. 1966, par. 8, 9.
On the ut, and that (German “dass”, French “que”) connectives, comp. K. Opalek, “On the logical-semantic structure of directives”, cit. above, p. 188.
Ibidem, p. 189 f.
Comp. — on the one hand — R. Catnap’s view in Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London 1935, p. 24, that of Ch.L. Stevenson in Facts and Values. Studies in Ethical Analysis, New Haven and London 1963, eh. II, and that of A. Ross, op.cit., p. 37 f; comp. — on the other hand — C. Well-man’s analyses of the evaluative, directive and critical meaning (op.cit., eh. VIII-X).
Comp., e.g., J. Lande, op. cit., p. 786 f; on the concept of instrumental goodness — G.H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness, ed. II, London 1964, eh. II.
Teleological directives (rules, norms) were frequently discussed, while teleological optatives were never mentioned. An example of the optative statement of this kind can be: “May we have fine weather tomorrow in order to make the trip we are planning”.
Comp. the remarks of J. Wolenski, “Spur o znaczenie normatywne” (“Contention on the subject of `normative meaning”’), in Naturalistyczne i antynaturalistyczne interpretacje humanistyki (The Naturalistic and Antinaturalistic Interpretation of Humanities), Poznan 1966, and those of J. Wróblewski, “The problem of the meaning of the legal norm”, Osterr. Zeitschr f Off Recht XIV, 3–4, 1964, p. 254 i, comp. also the discussion of Ch.L. Stevenson, op.cit., eh. IX, and M. Black, “Some questions about emotive meaning”, The Philosophical Rev. 57, 1948, on “strictly evoking”, “strictly designating”, “suggesting a thought”. Comp. also W. Alston, Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs 1964, p. 10 ff.
K. Opalek, “The problem of `directive meaning”’, cit. above, p. 420.
Here the contributions of the ordinary language philosophy have to be stressed. Comp. J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, London 1962, lect. VIII ff.
This holds true also in the case when a person establishes a directive for himself, and in the instance of conditional directives determining a “proper” (valid, etc.) way of conduct as means of attaining an end in case a person decides to pursue this end (e.g., the norms determining the way of contracting marriage, or of carrying out a sale — and purchase deed).
On the concept of “wish” comp. G.H. von Wright, “On the logic of some axiological and epistemological concepts”, in Ajatus XVII, 1952, p. 213 ff
The “types of addressing” were analysed by S. Frydman, “Dogmatyka prawa w §wietle socjologii” (“Doctrinal study of law in the light of sociology”), Ogólna nauka o prawie (General Science of Law), ed. B. Wróblewski, Vol. I, Wilno 1936, p. 146 ff
Comp. in this connection A. Ross, op.cit., p. 123 f; K. Opalek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa (Problems of Legal Theory), Warszawa 1969, p. 107 f.
K. Opalek, “On the logical-semantic structure of directives”, cit. above, p. 187 f
Fulfilment“ (”satisfaction“) in this sense in A. Hofstadter, J.C.C. McKinsey, ”On the logic of imperatives“, Philosophy of Science, Oct. 1939, p. 446 ff: J. Wróblewski, I.c.
Such statements are termed “relational statements” — comp. J. Wróblewski, “Zwroty stosunkowe — wypowiedzi o zgodnosci z nonna” (“Relational statements — statements on conformity with norm”), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniw. Lódzkiego (The Lodi Univ. Review) 62, 1969.
o F. Studnicki, “Traffic signs”, Semiotica II, 2, 1970, p. 164 ff., introduces the concept of “normative states of affairs” fulfilling normative statem ents. Criticism by K. Opalek, “The problem of directive meaning”, cit. above, p. 414, same author, “The problem of the existence of the norm”, Festschrift fir Adolf J. Merkl, München 1970, p. 293 f.
Attention has to be paid in this connection to the remarks of M. Black, “Analysis of rules” in Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy, Ithaca 1962, p. 100.
Comp. K. Opalek, “The complexity of law and of the methods of its study”, Scientia. Revue Internationale de Synthese Scientifique, CIV, 5–6, 1969, p. 287; same author, “Law as social phenomenon”, Archiv fur Rechts and Sozialphilosophie, 1, 1971, p. 47 f.
R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, cit. above, par. 1.
Comp. E Studnicki, Przeplyw ih formacji o normach prawa (The Flow of Information on Legal Norms), Krakow 1965, in connection with the problem of the effectiveness of the legal norms, p. 35 ff.
Comp. A. Ross, op.cit., par. 37.
Comp. J. Nowacki, “O rodzajach ocen ze wzgedu na norme” (On the kinds of value statements based on norms), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniw. Lódzkiego (The Lódz Univ. Review) 14, 1959, p. 19 ff., and the literature cited there.
Such relational statements, however, appear in the role of components of the statements of the latter kind, comp. J. Wróblewski, “Statements on the relation of conduct and norm”, Logique et Analyse, XIII, 49–50, 1970, p. 157 f.
It is rather striking that the value statements are quite often reconstructed as conjunctions of descriptive and some sui generis (directive, optative, etc.) statements. When adopting such a course, it would seem invitng to try, e.g., to define the statement that something is good as a hypothetical or disjunctive optative, so that:
Understanding is surely a pragmatic concept, and not a semantic one. Our opinion differs here from that of J. Wróblewski, “The problem of the meaning of the legal norm”, op.cit., p. 262 tf.
Comp. Ch.L. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 21 f. (“laudatory”–“derogatory”).
Comp. K. Opalek, “Some problems of the theory of norms”, Logique et Analyse XII, 1969, p.91ff
On the character of legal reasonings comp. “Le raisonnement juridique et la logique déontique, Actes du Colloque de Bruxelles (23–25 Dec. 1969), esp. the paper by G. Kalinowski, ”Le raisonnement juridique et la logique juridique“, and the standpoint represented by Ch. Perelman, Logique et Annlyse XIII, 49–50, p. 3 fT, 25 W, 52 f, and passim.
This problem is widely discussed, and at least some directives (axiological norms) are said to be in some sense secondary to value statements. G.H. von Wright, An Essay..., cit. above, p. 12, inclines “(...) towards a position according to which value are basic and primary, norms derivative and secondary. Norms, according to this view, are often said to be instrumental towards realization of some values”. Our analysis leads to different results.
G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, cit. above, p. 14 f.
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Woleński, J. (1999). Directives, Optatives, and Value Statements. In: Woleński, J. (eds) Kazimierz Opałek Selected Papers in Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_18
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