Abstract
The term “directive” (or “directive statement”) is used here in a broad sense, comprising norms, commands, requests, exhortations, suggestions, advice, rules (e.g., of games), and the like.1 One would be tempted to say that they are“directive statements”, having the same general kind of meaning (the “directive meaning”)2. The directives, as we see, are variously termed: a fact testifying to their differentiation. The terms mentioned above are, however, vague, and not apt to buildup a proper classification of directives. The classification which would be of interest to us would involve distinguishing, among directives, some groups of statements with peculiar kinds of meaning, constituting the subspecies of directive meaning. This matter, however, is not a simple one.3 For our analyses the general concept of directive meaning will suffice, together with roughly pointing to the extensiveness of the range of statements covered by the term “directive” and to their differentiation, to avoid some limitations of the analysis, not infrequently noted in this field.4
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The use of the term “directive” is analogous in A. Ross, Directives and Norms,London 1968 (but different as to the relation between directives and norms, par. 20 f).
K. Opalek, “The problem of `directive meaning”’, in Festkr/t til Professor, Dr. Jur. et Phil. Alf Ross,Copenhagen 1969, these volume pp..
Comp. R. Carnap, “A. Kaplan on value judgments”, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap,ed. P.A. Schilpp, (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IX), La Salle-London 1963, pp. 1011 f. (with respect to the larger category of “optative statements”, comprising, among others, directives). Comp. the classifications of directives (nouns) in G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action,London 1963, ch. 1., A. Ross, op. cit., par. 10 if.
Here we have in mind the ways of analysis frequent in legal theory, concentrating on legal norms only.
R. Suszko, Zarys elementarnej skladni logicznej ( An Outline of the Elementary Logical Syntax ), Warszawa 1957, p. 4.
Comp. e.g., C. Wellman, The Langunge of Ethics,Cambridge Mass. 1961, ch. 9, 10, and p. 290; differently O. Weinberger, “Die Sollsatzproblematik in der modernen Logik”, Rozpravy C K eskoslovenské Akademie Ved,68, 9, 1958, p. 1 f.
Comp. E.J. Lemmon, “Deontic Logic and the Logic of Lnperatives”, Logique et Analyse,VIII, 29, 1965, pp. 44 if..
As for the analogous problem with respect to value statements see R.G. Brown, I.M. Copi, Don E. Dulaney, W.K. Frankena, P. Heide, Ch.L. Stevenson, Language, Thought, and Culture,Ann Arbor, 1959, pp.149 f. On normative names J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii wykladni prawa ludowego (Problems of the Theory of Interpretation of the Socialist Law), Warszawa 1960, part. I.
Comp. J. Lande, Studia z filozofii prawa (Studies in Legal Philosophy), Warszawa 1959, pp. 930 f.
J. Wróblewski, “Zagadnienia zastowania maszyn matematycznych w prawoznawstwie” (Problems of applying computers to legal science), Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne (Legal-Economic Studies), Vol. I, Lódz 1968, pp. 50 ft: Comp. e.g. J. Wolenski, “Spór o `znaczenie normatywne”’. (Contentention on the subject of `normative meaning’), in Naturalislyczne i antynaturalistyczne interpretacje humanistyki (The Naturalistic and Antinaturalistic Interpretations of Humanities), Poznan 1966, pp. 4 ff.
Discussed in O. Weinberger, op. cit., passim; E.J. Lemmon, op. cit., 55 fï’; G.H. von Wright, “The logic of practical discourse”, in Contemporary Philosophy. A Survey, ed. by R. Klibansky, Firenze 1968 pp. 153
The same distinction, based on some conceptions of ordinary language philosophy, was proposed by E. Studnicki in a discussion of the problems of “directive meaning” in the Department of Legal Theory of Cracow University, in October 1968.
These formulas are only provisional; they will be rectified in the course of our analyses (comp. below 14.4 fi).
The view of I. Hedenius, discussed below (10) is related to (d), but more complicated.
O, Winberger, op. cit., and “Können Sollsätze (Imperative) als wahr bezeichnet werden?”, in the same issue of Rozpravy…,pp. 146 ft; N. Rescher, The Logic of Commands,London — New York 1966, pp. 38 ff.
A. Ross, op. cit., par. 4,5,9.
C.H. Langford, M. Langford, “Introduction to logic”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1953, p. 565, discussed by A. Ross, op. cit., pp. 71 f.
A. Ross, op. cit., pp. 14, 17 f., 71 (comp. R.M. Hare, The Language ofMorals,Oxford 1952, pp. 18 f).
L Hedenius, “Befalningsatser, nonner och värdeutsagor (Commands, norms and value — propositions), in Nordist Sommeruniversitet,1954, cf. A. Ross, op. cit., pp. 32 ff.
A. Ross, op. cit., S 4; H.G. Brown, I.M. Copi, Don E. Dulaney, W.K. Frankena, P. Henle, Ch.L. Stevenson, op. cit., Ch. 5 ang 6.
K. Ajdukiewicz, O znaczeniu wyraien ( On the Meaning of Linguistic Expressions ), Lwów 1931, p. 44.
Comp. H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre,Tübingen 1920, p. 99; A. Ross, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis. Zugleich prolegomena zu einer Kritik der Rechtwissenschaft,Kopenhagen — Leipzig 1933, pp. 52 if.., and Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence. A Criticism of the Dualism in Law,Copenhagen 1946, pp. 39 ff.
G.H. von Wright, “An essay in deontic logic and the general theory of action, Acta Philosophica Fennica, XXI, Amsterdam 1968, p. 16.
d (“so it ought to be”) can also be predicated only of a sentence, not of a name.
Comp. K. Ajdukiewicz, “Zwiazki skladniowe miçdzy czlonami zdan oznajmujäcych” (Syntactical relations between the components of indicative sentences), in Jgzyk i poznanie (Language and Cognition), Vol. II, Warszawa 1965, pp. 345 if
Comp. J. Wolenski op. cit., and, J. Wróblewski, “The problem of the meaning of the legal norm”, Österreichische Zeitschrift fair öffentliches Recht,XIV, 3–4, 1964, pp. 254 ff.
Here we have in mind the problem connected with customary rules, e.g., customary law: according to some views, the obligation to do something can be inferred from the fact that members of the group used to do it regularly in previous times.
Comp.
R. Carnap, op. cit., p. 1002.
It seems hardly justified to speak about the “conjunction” of a value statement and a descriptive statement; the meaning of directives seems to consist in something different from the meaning of value statements.
Comp. the discussion on ought entails can in (G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action,cit. above, ch. VII; E.J. Lemmon, op. cit., pp. 47 ff; R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason,Oxford 1963, pp. 51 fI:
E. Stenius, “The principles of a logic of normative systems”, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, XVI, 1963, Proceedings of a Colloquium on Modal and Many-Valued Logics, Helsinki, 23–26 August, 1962, p. 248.
G.H. von Wright,An Essay…,cit. above, pp. 14, 16 (and similarly A.R. Anderson and A.N. Prior, cit. there). Compare on this subject G. Kalinowski, “Introduction à la logique juridique”, Bibliotheque de Philosophie du Droit,Vol. VIII, Paris 1965, pp. 82 ff
R. Carnap, op. cit., p. 1004 ff
Cf. G.H. von Wright, The logic of practical discourse, cit. above pp. 144 ff.; An Essay…, cit. above, pp. 13 f “Deontic logic”, Mind, 60, 1951, and “Deontic logics”, American Philosophical Quarterly 4, 1967.
Sometimes O (0) is used as basic, permission being defined as (- O —) — D —, 0), cf. e.g., E.J. Lemmon, op. cit., p. 40; on the relations between P-concepts and O-concepts cf. G.H. von Wright, An Essay…,cit. above, pp. 22 fl:, 34 if
Cf. E.J. Lemmon, op. cit., pp. 43 f.
The ut comes close to “utinam” in optative statements, cf. R. Carnap, op. cit., pp. 1004 f Optative statements have to some extent been analysed by K. Menger, “A Logic of the doubtful. On optative and imperative logic”, Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums,S. II, I, 1939.
Comp. J. Nowacki, “O rodzajach ocen ze wzglgdu na nonnq” (On the kinds of value statements based on norms), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersvtetu Lódzkiego (The Lódz University Review), S. I, No 14, 1959, pp. 20 ff
b1 this connection of R. Montague, “Syntactical treatments of modality, with corollaries on reflexion principles and finite axiomatizability”, Acta Philosophica Fennica,XVI, 1963, pp. 153 ff.
W. van Orman Quine, Elementary Logic,rev. ed., Cambridge Mass. 1966, p. 24.
Cf. notes 28 and 30.
K. Opalek, op. cit., pp…; Cf. also M. Black, “The analysis of rules”, in Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy, Ithaca 1962, p. 100.
Cf. G.H. von Wright on the logic of change in Norm and Action,cit. above, ch. II, pp. 28 f, and on the relation of act to change, ibid., eh. II, pp. 42 ff.
Cf. A. Ross, Directives and Norms,cit. above, par. 10, 11, 12, and p. 60.
Attempts have been made in the legal field to discuss “stronger” and “weaker” norms on the basis of a graduation of their pragmatic function, cf. N. Bobbio, “Due variazioni sul tema dell’imperativismo”, in Atti del IV Congresso Nazionale di Filosofia del Diritto,Milano 1960; “Per una classificazione degli imperativi giuridici”, in Scritti giuridici in memoria di Piero Calamandrei, v. V, Padova 1956; “Comandi e consigli”, in Raccolta dei scritti in onore di Arturo Carlo Jemolo, v. IV, Milano; “Norma giuridica”, in Novissimo Digesto Italiano,Torino, pp. 19–23.
Cf. J. Lande, op. cit., pp. 924 f.; O. Weinberger, “Einige Betrachtungen über die Rechtsnorm vom Standpunkt der Logik and der Semantik”, Logique et Analyse, 28, 1964, p. 230.
Cf. M. Black, op. cit., pp. 107 f.
Cf. A. Ross, Directives and Norms,pp. 107 tl:
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Woleński, J. (1999). On the Logical-Semantic Structure of Directives. In: Woleński, J. (eds) Kazimierz Opałek Selected Papers in Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9257-4_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5230-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9257-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive