Solidarity pp 243-272 | Cite as

Solidarity as a Social Norm and as a Constitutional Norm

  • Michael Baurmann
Part of the Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture book series (PSCC, volume 5)


I will use the term “solidarity” in a broad sense. By acting in solidarity I mean the voluntary transfer of goods or services to another individual or to a group of individuals whenever this transfer is not the object of an explicit contract. A transfer of this kind is unconditional in the sense that it is not contingent on the enforceable duty of the beneficiary to provide a specified equivalent for the gains he or she obtains. Acting in solidarity with a single individual means to contribute voluntarily and unconditionally to an individual good. Acting in solidarity with a group of individuals means to contribute voluntarily and unconditionally to a public good.1 If we analyze the empirical conditions which promote or impede solidarity in the sense of voluntarily and unconditionally contributing to individual or public goods we can identify three main empirical constellations. Let us begin with the constellations in regard to solidarity in favor of public goods.


Public Good Individual Contribution Individual Good Moral Norm Individual Interest 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Baurmann
    • 1
  1. 1.University of DüsseldorfGermany

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