Mapping the Structure of Truth: Davidson Contra Rorty

Abstract

It is folly, Davidson tells us, to attempt to define truth (Davidson 1996). Truth, according to Davidson, cannot be explicated by reference to notions of coherence, correspondence or assertability, nor is the Tarskian account of truth adequate to tell us anything about truth as such (Davidson 1991a)¹. What is required is instead an understanding of the role truth plays in relation to meaning and to the propositional attitudes and behaviour — truth is to be understood through its relation to the notions of belief and desire and through the essential role it plays in the understanding of language and action. On the account offered by Richard Rorty, however, there is no role for truth here that is over and above the role played by justification. So, in a recent article, Rorty writes that “[t]he need to justify our beliefs and desires to ourselves and to our fellow-agents subjects us to norms, and obedience to these norms produces a behavioural pattern which we must detect in others before confidently attributing any beliefs to them. But there seems no occasion to look for obedience to an additional norm, the commandment to seek the truth. For... obedience to that commandment will produce no behaviour not produced by the need to offer justification” (Rorty, 1995: p.287).