Abstract
If a proposition is entailed by a set of laws of nature, does that make it a law? Call this the Entailment Question. There are two intuitively appealing ways of thinking about laws which produce sharply conflicting answers to this question.
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Baker, A. (1999). Are the Laws of Nature Deductively Closed?. In: Sankey, H. (eds) Causation and Laws of Nature. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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