Abstract
If I were to drop an apple, then it would fall. It is not possible that it would fly upwards. It is necessary that it would fall. I think these statements are true, but at the same time I believe that it is not logically necessary that the apple would fall. I believe that there is in nature a kind of necessity weaker than logical necessity: natural necessity.
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References
Ellis, B.D. (this volume [a]), ‘Causal Powers and Laws of Nature’
Ellis, B.D. (this volume [b]), ‘Bigelow’s Worries About Scientific Essentialism’, 61–75
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Leckey, M.J., and J.C. Bigelow (1995), ‘The Necessitarian Perspective: Laws as Natural Entailments’, in Laws of Nature, edited by F. Weinert, Berlin: de Gruyter, 92–119
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Leckey, M. (1999). The Naturalness Theory of Laws. In: Sankey, H. (eds) Causation and Laws of Nature. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_7
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