Abstract
In this paper I want to explore how laws, or statements which have some of the characteristics which we associate with laws, can be employed to capture the notion of causal dependence, and also how this latter concept can accommodate a process account of causation. David Lewis (1986 [1973]) proposed that we take causal dependence as the basic notion, with causal connection being defined in terms of it. However Lewis equates causal dependence with counterfactual dependence, and there are objections from an empiricist perspective to the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. An account of causal dependence which invokes the regularities that we discover in nature, and does not presuppose counterfactuals, is proposed in Clendinnen (1992).1 This makes it possible to retain the advantages of a dependence account of causation while avoiding the metaphysical commitments of Lewis’s theory. This paper explores the conceptual grounding of such a theory and how it relates to Wesley Salmon’ s account of causal process. In particular it considers those processes which include irreducibly probabilistic steps.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Armstrong, D.M. (1983), What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Carnap, R. (1950), Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Clendinnen, F.J. (1992), ‘Nomic Dependence and Causation’, Philosophy of Science 59, 341–60
Clendinnen, F.J. (1996), ‘Theorizing and Empirical Belief’, in Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology, Peter Riggs (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 63–92
Dowe, Phil (1992), ‘Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory’, Philosophy of Science 59, 195–216
Humphreys, Paul W. (1989), The Chances of Explanation, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Lewis, David (1973), ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy 70, 556–67, Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, by David Lewis, New York: Oxford University Press, 159–72 (References are to the reprint Lewis (1986).)
Reichenbach, Hans (1976), Laws, Modalities and Counterfactuals, Berkeley: University of California Press (second edn. of Reichenbach, 1954)
Reichenbach, Hans (1954), Nomological Statements and Admissible Operations, Amsterdam: North Holland
Salmon, Wesley C. (1967), The Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
Salmon, Wesley C. (ed.) (1971), Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
Salmon, Wesley C. (1976), ‘Foreword’ to Reichenbach (1976)
Salmon, Wesley C. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Salmon, Wesley C. (1994), ‘Causality Without Counterfactuals’, Philosophy of Science 61, 297–312
Smart, J.J.C. (1985), ‘Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences’, The Philosophical Quarterly 35, 272–280
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Clendinnen, F.J. (1999). Causal Dependence and Laws. In: Sankey, H. (eds) Causation and Laws of Nature. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5303-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9229-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive