Abstract
According to Davidson, the aim of the theory of interpretation is to provide the information needed for understanding the sentences of a language and, at the same time, indicate which beliefs speakers must have considering the sentences they are disposed to utter. On this point he says:
Since we cannot hope to interpret linguistic activity without knowing what a speaker believes, and cannot found a theory of what he means as a prior discovery of his beliefs and intentions. I conclude that in interpreting utterances from scratch — in radical interpretation — we must somehow deliver simultaneously a theory of belief and a theory of meaning. (Davidson 1974a, p. 312).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aristotle, 1915: Nicomachean Ethics, in W. Ross (ed.), Works of Aristotle, Oxford University Press, Oxford, vol. 9.
Davidson, D. 1963: “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”; now in Davidson 1980, pp. 3–19.
Davidson, D. 1970a: “Mental Events”, now in Davidson 1980, pp. 207–224.
Davidson, D. 1970b: “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?”, now in Davidson 1980, pp. 21–42.
Davidson, D. 1973: “Radical Interpretation”, Dialectica, 27, pp. 313–28.
Davidson, D. 1974a: “Belief and the Basis of Meaning”, Synthese, 27, pp. 309–23.
Davidson, D. 19746: “On the Very Idea of Conceptual Schema”, Proceedings and Addressings of the American Philosophical Association,pp. 5–20.
Davidson, D. 1975: “Thought and Talk”. in Mind and Language (Wolfson College Lectures), Clarendon Press, Oxford: now in Davidson 1984, pp. 155–170.
Davidson, D. 1980: Essays on Action and Events, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Davidson, D. 1982: “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, in Wollheim and Hopkins (eds.) 1982, pp. 289–305.
Davidson, D. 1984: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Davidson, D. 1985a: “Deception and Division”, in Lepore and McLaughlin (eds.) 1985, pp. 138–48.
Davidson, D. 1985b: “Incoherence and Irrationality”. Dialectica, 39, pp. 345–354.
Demos, R. 1960: “Lying to Oneself”, Journal of Philosophy, 57, pp. 588–95.
Dennett, D.C. 1971: “Intentional Systems”, Journal of Philosophy, 68, pp. 87–106.
Elster, J. 1979: Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fingarette, H. 1969: Self-Deception, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Fodor, J.A., and E. Lepore 1992: Holism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Mele, A. 1987: Irrationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pears, D. 1982: “Motivated Irrationality, Freudian Theory, and Cognitive Dissonance”, in Wollheim and Hopkins (eds.) 1982, pp. 264–88.
Picardi, E. 1992a: “Donald Davidson” in M. Santambrogio (a cura di), Introduzione alla filosofia analitica del linguaggio, Laterza, Roma-Bari, pp. 223–66.
Picardi, E. 1992b: Linguaggio e analisi filosofica, Patron, Bologna.
Quine, W.V.O. 1969: Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
Wollheim, R., and J. Hopkins (eds.) 1982: Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gozzano, S. (1999). Davidson on Rationality and Irrationality. In: de Caro, M. (eds) Interpretations and Causes. Synthese Library, vol 285. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9227-7_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9227-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5283-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9227-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive