Abstract
For some years now, it has been widely acknowledged that many of the most central issues in the Philosophy of Language are inseparable from questions in the Philosophy of Mind. In this fusion, Donald Davidson has played a pioneering part. Countless numbers of contemporary philosophers participate now in this integrated pursuit. But in fact Davidson has raised the stakes much higher than to simply bring in considerations of mind into the study of language. He has done so by adding to our interest in this integrated subject a crucial further set of considerations from epistemology as well. This makes the stakes higher yet because now any conception of meaning must not only find itself constrained to square with a plausible philosophy of mind, but any conception of mind and meaning must find itself squaring with a credible epistemology. This raises the philosophical task involved to an altogether higher plane of ambition. Here the influence has unfortunately not been as widespread, and, as a result, much short-sighted philosophy of language and mind continues to dominate the field.
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Bilgrami, A. (1999). Internalism and Scepticism. In: de Caro, M. (eds) Interpretations and Causes. Synthese Library, vol 285. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9227-7_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9227-7_15
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