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Know-How

  • Munindar P. Singh
Part of the Applied Logic Series book series (APLS, volume 14)

Abstract

The study of knowledge is crucial to the science of rational agency. This fact is well-recognized in artificial intelligence (AI) and related fields. However, most often the form of knowledge that is studied and formalized is the knowledge of (putative) facts. We refer to this form of knowledge as know-that. Know-that has proved an extremely successful concept in AI, being the basis of a large number of AI systems, which are therefore termed knowledge-based.

Keywords

Modal Logic Basic Action Formal Language Modal Approach Atomic Proposition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Munindar P. Singh
    • 1
  1. 1.North Carolina State UniversityUSA

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