Abstract
The initial qualified commitment of Annex 1 countries under the Framework Convention on Climate Change to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels showed little regard for economic considerations. Unilateral stabilization could impose markedly different costs on different countries and is not a cost minimizing approach to abatement. However, as negotiations have progressed and the problem has been increasingly studied, economic considerations have become more prominent. A number of countries now support differentiated targets to take account of the special economic circumstances of different economies and an emission trading scheme has been proposed in policy negotiations.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hinchy, M., Fisher, B.S. (1999). Negotiating greenhouse abatement and the theory of public goods. In: Carraro, C. (eds) International Environmental Agreements on Climate Change. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Feem) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9169-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9169-0_3
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