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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 40))

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Abstract

I now want to sketch in a few words how the nature of environmental problems and the conceptual features of our relationship with future generations determine the general character of the issue we are dealing with.

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References

  1. Brown Weiss 1988, 27: “Thus our concern for our own country must, as we extend our concerns into larger time horizons…focus on protecting the planetary quality of our… environment.”

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  2. Laslett and Fishkin 1992, 11–14.

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  3. Ibid., 14. I have skipped Laslett and Fishkin’s discussion of how kinship analogies cannot remedy the arbitrary character of the “cohort”: see ibid. 8–10.

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  4. The “chain of love” concept is developed by Passmore 1974, 88–89.

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  5. Daly and Cobb 1989, 39.

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  6. Finnis 1980, 205.

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  7. Feinberg 1980. I note that Feinberg’s argument, as it is based on examples taken from the legal system (representation of future interests), addresses a possible objection to the recognition of legal rights. But the argument is fully applicable, to start with, to what may be an objection to the notion of moral rights.

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  8. Ibid., 165: “no conscious wishes, desires and hopes; or urges and impulses; or unconscious drives, aims and goals; or latent tendencies, direction of growth, and natural fulfillments”.

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  9. Ibid., 178–179. “Contingent upon his birth”: i.e. effective in the present, but in anticipation of birth actually occurring, and so voidable if he dies first.

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  10. Ibid. Feinberg also discusses the question whether future generations have an actual interest: the interest to come into existence. He rightly denies it.

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  11. Parfit 1984, 351 f. Cf.the discussion in Achterberg 1994, 197–201. I must desist from discussing Parfit’s own (utilitarian) handling of the problem.

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  12. In the same sense: Achterberg 1994, 200 and Hilhorst 1987, 75–77. Hilhorst refers to D.MacLean, A moral requirement for energy policies, in D.MacLean, P.G.Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future, Totowa N.J. 1983, pp. 180–197.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Visser ’t Hooft, H.P. (1999). The Setting. In: Justice to Future Generations and the Environment. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9103-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9103-4_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5240-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9103-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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