Abstract
In this chapter I will examine Grice’s analysis of nonnatural meaning in some detail. We have seen that in artificial communication intentions play an essential rôle. An account of nonnatural meaning must take such intentional aspects into consideration. Now Grice’s approach not only takes due account of this aspect, but, as I will try to show, invokes intentions in excess. The result is its predominantly internalist character.
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References
He presents this in the form of a hierarchy of “basicness”. See for example (1989), pp. 116 ff.
(1989), pp. 90, 118.
(1989), p 91, 220.
(1989), pp. 217 ff.
As will be seen in Section Four, below, it is possible to object to this. I do not think the objection is justified, however.
Strawson (1964), p. 387. For a fuller discussion of such cases see Grice (1989), pp. 93–104, Schiffer (1972), pp. 17–42, and Avramides (1989), pp. 46–58.
Schiffer (1972).
I assume here for simplicity that factivity is unfulfilled.
I use “fact” in a richer sense including states of affairs and events.
“Implication” here is to be understood pre-logically, as an object of possible inference apart from any guarantee of the sufficiency of the antecedent for the consequent.
Schiffer (1972), p. 57.
Grice (1989), Chapter Five.
Both Y and Z are to be understood, therefore, as parts or aspects of X.
According to Dennis Stampe’s criteria this would be a grammatical mistake. See his (1969).
Grice (1989), p. 218.
In fact Schiffer adopts this strategy in dealing with all such cases except those of reminding, reviewing facts and inferring.
See Grice (1989), p. 113.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Denkel, A. (1999). Some Reflections upon the Speaker’s Meaning. In: The Natural Background of Meaning. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 197. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9084-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9084-6_5
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