Abstract
Very often, philosophical interest in the ontologies of causation and natural kinds is motivated by the importance of these issues for science. There is, however, another and equally fundamental reason for undertaking such an inquiry. Communication and meaning, both necessary conditions for science as we have it, are themselves possible in virtue of observable regularities. And the best explanation of the existence of observable regularities is that they are the manifestations of objective relationships which are aspects of the physical world. Unless some form of subjective idealism is adopted, there are compelling reasons for acknowledging that communication and meaning necessitate the existence of real essential and causal relations. Moreover, neither communication nor meaning would exist if the passage of time were merely a phenomenon, that is, an experience that owes its existence to our subjective conditions. Temporal flow must be real if what we conceive as conveying messages from one individual to another is to be regarded as a worldly fact. Hence an account of just how essences, causal relations and “temporal becoming” are objective is requisite as an adequate logical basis for our common belief that communication, and the meaningful utterances put to use in it, are not altogether an illusion.
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References
An event is the replacement of a property by another through time. It is a property-occurrence, therefore, however long, from then on such a property may last. I will use “event” and “property-occurrence” interchangeably.
See Alston (1989), pp. 228–9.
This is not to say that anything without order is easier to understand than it would be if it were orderly. Though more complex in itself, it is easier for us to make sense of something that embodies order, than something that does not.
Berkeley (1957), p. 37 (sections 30 and 32). “But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificance, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondance of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts of natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals… we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, ‘who works all in all’ and ‘by whom all things consist’.” pp. 97–8 (sect. 146).
Kant (1965), p. 68.
Kant (1965), p. 71, and 72.
Kant (1950), p. 69.
Kant (1965), p. 68. See pp. 74–75 for parallel remarks concerning time.
Kant (1965), p. 71.
Kant (1965), p. 89; see also pp. 80, 86. Elsewhere, however, in a different sense, Kant declares that space and time have a priori objective validity. (e.g., pp. 72, 138) He contrasts the “empirical reality” of space to its “transcendental ideality”.
Kant (1965), p. 80. “…space does not represent any determination that attaches to objects themselves…. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever”. (p. 71) “… nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, …space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property”. (pp. 73–74; see also pp. 86–7, 88–89.)
Kant (1965), p. 68, parentheses mine. For confirming opinion, see Copleston (1964), p. 31, Hartnack (1967), p. 28, and Wilkerson (1976), p. 23.
See Kant (1965), p. 89 for Kant’s reasons for maintaining that ascribing objective reality to space and time will turn everything into mere illusion.
Kant (1965), p. 43.
Kripke (1980), particularly p. 34 ff. See also Putnam (1973), (1975), (1978); Chisholm (1977) and Kitcher (1980). If Kant is integrating the two theses he may be doing so because he views necessity as strict universality. Clearly, Kripke’s points apply more broadly, and are not restricted to “strict universality”.
Kant (1965), p. 44.
Cf. T. Wilkerson’s comments on Kant’s concept of a priori in his (1976), pp. 21 ff., esp. p. 28.
Parsons (1992), p. 84, describes this as a long debate running at least since the publication of Kemp-Smith (1923), pp. 110–4.
Parsons (1992), p. 84.
Parsons (1992), p. 85; see also Kant (1965), p. 220.
Parsons (1992), p. 85, transposition mine.
Parsons (1992), p. 88.
Reichenbach (1930), p. 67. On p. 186, Reichenbach says that “To eliminate it from science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories.”
Popper contends “that a principle of induction is superfluous, and that it must lead to logical inconsistencies”, that all this should be “… clear from the work of Hume” and that “… the various difficulties of inductive logic … are insurmountable”. (1980), p. 29.
According to one view, frequency sustains the only acceptable concept of probability. See Reichenbach (1938), pp. 298–312.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 339.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 341.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 342. See Hume (1979), Section IV, pp. 40–53, esp pp. 47–8.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 346.
Hume (1969), p. 184.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 347.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 347.
Reichenbach (1938), p. 348.
Reichenbach (1938), pp. 356–7. See also (1949), pp. 469–82.
See Peirce (1940), pp. 150 ff. Russell (1948), pp. 421–507; Black (1949), pp. 59–88; Strawson (1952), pp. 248–63; Goodman (1983), Chapters 3 and 4; Salmon (1967).
See Armstrong (1983), esp. pp. 11–73.
Armstrong (1983), p. 7.
Armstrong (1983), pp. 6–7.
Armstrong (1983), p. 8.
Armstrong (1983), p. 11.
Armstrong (1983), p. 13.
Armstrong (1983), Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Armstrong (1983), p. 77.
Armstrong (1983), p. 78.
Armstrong (1983), p. 78, emphasis mine.
Armstrong (1983), p. 85.
Armstrong (1983), p. 86.
Armstrong (1983), p. 88.
Where, due to distance for example, communication takes much longer than the individuals’ lifespan, as in the hypothetical case of interstellar communication between two remotely separated cultures, one may encounter instances of such an unusual type of exchange.
See Lewis (1986), p. 202. See also Quine (1960), p. 171; (1961), pp. 64–5.
See Lewis (1986), p. 202.
Cf. Heller (1992), pp. 703–4.
Grünbaum (1968), p. 324.
Grünbaum (1968), pp. 335–6. See also Mellor (1981), pp. 114–8, 168–71, and Chapter Nine, section two, below.
For the opposite opinion see van Inwagen (1990).
See Denkel (1996), pp. 71ff. This holds unless the same individual, which is at positions p1 and p2, occupies the positions in between, continuously. In such a case we are speaking of two spatial parts of the same thing. Moreover, the possibility of cohabitation does not affect my point, since I am interested here in the multiplicity and not the sameness of positions.
Mellor (1981), p. 104 ff and p. 124 ff.
See Mellor (1994), Oaklander (1994e) and Williams (1994).
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Denkel, A. (1999). Introduction: Regularities and the Objective Background of Communication. In: The Natural Background of Meaning. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 197. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9084-6_1
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